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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS IN NEED OF A
THEORY—IN DEFENSE OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
Ittai Paldor*
In recent years theorists have argued that institutional investors’
diversification harms competition. The theory is that when portfolio firms
are cross-owned by institutional investors, managements compete less
vigorously than they would have but for the cross ownership. The theory
was bolstered by several empirical studies. The supporting empirical
studies have been contested on methodological grounds, and some recent
empirical studies make contradicting findings. But the theory of
competitive harm itself is still considered persuasive. The federal
antitrust agencies and competition agencies across the globe have begun
to take action against instances of cross ownership based on this theory,
in what has been described as an attack on the entire system of mutual
fund holdings. This Article resolves the mismatch between theory and the
most recent empirical findings. The Article develops an understanding of
cross ownership and its effects on portfolio firms’ conduct. It challenges
the theory of competitive harm, and shows that institutional investors’
common ownership cannot adversely affect portfolio firms’ competitive
conduct. Moreover, the Article shows that cross ownership actually
safeguards against competitive harm of the kind envisioned in the
literature. The theory developed in this Article suggests that enforcement
measures taken against instances of cross ownership are socially
harmful. They unduly deny investors the long-acknowledged benefits of
diversification and disrupt the functioning of capital markets. These
enforcement efforts should be abandoned as swiftly as they were
initiated.

* Assistant Professor, Hebrew University Faculty of Law (SJD, University of Toronto,
Faculty of Law). I am greatly indebted to Edward Rock, Jesse Fried, Assaf Hamdani, participants
of the American Bar Association/New York University 2018 Annual Conference, and participants
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the Hebrew University Faculty of Law Seminar for extremely helpful comments, discussions, and
suggestions on earlier drafts of this manuscript. The generous financial support provided by the
Israel Science Foundation (grant number 877/18) is also greatly appreciated. Chaim Danino, Omri
Leabovich, Dorin Erteschik, and Tahel Grunwald provided invaluable research assistance. All
errors remain my own.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article suggests a new understanding of the competitive
impact of institutional investors’ diversification strategy. The view
currently prevalent in the literature, which has been adopted by the
federal antitrust enforcement agencies and competition agencies
across the globe, is that institutional investors’ cross ownership chills
portfolio firms’ competitive incentives.1 The Article explains why this
intuitive theory of competitive harm is flawed. In fact, the Article
shows that institutional investors’ cross ownership actually safeguards
against the competitive harm argued for in the recent literature.
Institutional investors are “the dominant capital market players of our
time, displacing dispersed individual investors, who now obtain
exposure to equity markets through the intermediation of the
institutional investors.”2 They have become the dominant owners of
public equity in most Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries.3 According to an OECD report for
2018, in approximately half of OECD countries institutional investors’
financial assets amounted to over 25 percent of the respective
country’s GDP, and in some countries far exceeded the country’s
GDP.4 Institutional investors account for the vast majority of equityholding across the globe. According to some estimates, nearly 80
percent of the total value of the U.S. stock market is held by
institutional investors.5 U.S.-registered investment companies
1. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Rise of Institutional Investors Raises Questions of Collusion,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/business/dealbook/rise-ofinstitutional-investors-raisesquestions-of-collusion.html; Pauline Kennedy et al., The Competitive
Effects of Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence 2 (Jul. 26, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3008331 (unpublished paper); Menesh S.
Patel, Common Ownership, Institutional Investors, and Antitrust, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 279, 281
(2018) (although at least one of the investigations mentioned by Patel has apparently been
abandoned); Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82
ANTITRUST L.J. 221, 222 (2018); Case C-M.7932, Dow/DuPont, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf.
2. Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional
Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669 (2017).
3. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., OECD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR S TATISTICS 2010–
2017, at 15–108 (2018).
4. Id. at 12–14.
5. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 674; Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money
Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2056 (1995); Patel, supra note 1, at 279; José Azar et al.,
Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1514 (2018); Einer Elhauge,
Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1277–78 (2016).
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“managed more than $19 trillion in assets at year-end 2016, largely on
behalf of more than 95 million US retail investors.”6 The total value
of the assets held by these institutional investors is constantly rising.7
In the United Kingdom, institutional investors managed
approximately £4.75 trillion in assets in 2016,8 and direct ownership
of stock by retail investors has declined from 54 percent in the mid1960s to 11 percent in 2014.9 In Canada, too, institutional portfolio
has been constantly rising for 65 years.10 By 2014 institutional
investors held nearly C$2 trillion in assets.11 Across OECD countries,
assets held by institutional investors totaled more than $73.4 trillion in
2011.12 Any rule regulating the investment strategies of these investors
is thus of major significance to the U.S. economy, as well as to the
global economy.
Institutional investors regularly diversify their investment across
a large number of firms and industries.13 This diversification is
socially important. First, diversification safeguards the investment
against idiosyncratic (both firm-specific and industry-specific) risk.14
Second, and closely related, diversified investments obviate the need
to pick specific stock.15 This lowers the cost of obtaining information
and analyzing it,16 and even the cost of monitoring management. At
6. INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND
ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 6 (57th ed. 2017).
7. See id. at 6–9. The constant trend has shown two dips, in 2008 and in 2011. Id. at 9. Both
resulted in an almost immediate bounce back. Id. For a survey of a similar trend across the OECD
area (a 6.6 percent average annual increase in the 1995–2005 decade), see Eric Gonnard et al.,
Recent Trend in Institutional Investors Statistics, 2008 OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 1, 1, 3,
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/42143444.pdf.
8. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., OECD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR S TATISTICS 2009–
2016, at 168–69 (2017).
9. Serdar Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and Ownership Engagement, 2013
OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 93, 93, 96 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/finance/Institutionalinvestors-ownership-engagement.pdf.
10. Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Role of Institutional and Retail Investors in Canadian Capital
Markets, 31 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 371, 373–74 n.1 (1993).
11. Alix d’Anglejan-Chatillon & Jeffrey Elliott, Canada, in THE ASSET MANAGEMENT
REVIEW 111, 118 (Paul Dickson ed., 6th ed. 2017); Research, 2015 Canadian Institutional
Investors:
Institutional
Asset
Allocation,
Greenwich
Assocs.
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.greenwich.com/sites/default/files/files/reports/2015%20Canadian%20Institutional%
20Investors%20-%20Institutional%20Asset%20Allocation%20-%20Graphics.pdf.
12. Çelik & Isaksson, supra note 9, at 97.
13. Patel, supra note 1, at 283–84.
14. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 89 (1952).
15. Dov Solomon, Rational Apathy of Shareholders: How to Awake Investors from Their
Sleep, 39 TEL AVIV UNIV. L. REV. 317, 340–41 (2016).
16. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 672–73.
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times, the diversification is achieved almost mechanically through
index funds,17 which require practically no analysis prior to
purchasing stock, and no post-purchase monitoring of day-to-day
activities.18 In other cases, the diversification is less mechanical. But
whether the investment is entirely mechanical or requires some limited
human involvement, the costs of investment are reduced dramatically.
Of course, the reduced risk and lower costs of investment benefit not
only the institutional investors themselves, but also retail investors.
These advantages translate into lower fees and reduced risk for retail
investors.19
One immediate result of institutional investors’ diversification
and the large amount of funds they manage is that they own stock of a
large number of firms and across a large number of industries.20
Institutional investors are estimated to be the (joint) largest
shareholders of nearly 90 percent of public companies in the S&P
500.21 When combined, the largest institutional investors (BlackRock,
Vanguard and State Street) are “the single largest shareholder of at
least 40 percent of all public companies in the United States.”22
Naturally, institutional investors’ portfolio is often comprised of stock
of several firms that are active in the same industry. “The probability
that two randomly selected [S&P 1500] firms in the same industry . . .
have a common shareholder with at least 5% stakes in both firms [is
in the vicinity of] 90 percent . . . .”23

17. Which Posner et al. estimate account for less than 20 percent of the U.S. stock market. Id.
at 673. See id. at 673 n.12 for an explanation of this estimate.
18. For a comprehensive account of index funds’ disengagement in what they term “micromechanisms” and for an analysis of why involvement in portfolio firms’ day-to-day activity is
unlikely, see C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common
Ownership, 129 YALE L.J. 1392, 1450–52 (2020).
19. See Posner et al., supra note 2, at 673.
20. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1268.
21. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 674.
22. Id.
23. José Azar, Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, and the Theory of the Firm 2 (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2811221 (unpublished paper).
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At the same time, many industries are oligopolistic industries,24
in which there are relatively few competitors.25 Given the prevalence
of oligopolistic industries on the one hand and the dominance of
institutional investors on the other, it seems safe to conclude, as
scholars and others do, that diversification by institutional investors
has resulted in a widespread phenomenon of several institutional
investors holding stock of several firms that compete amongst
themselves in oligopolistic product markets.26
Until relatively recently, the passive common ownership
phenomenon was considered competitively benign. As such, it was
exempt from antitrust scrutiny and from premerger notification filings
under what has come to be known as the “investment-only exemption”
afforded by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act
(HSR).27 The HSR imposes premerger notification obligations on
parties to certain stock acquisitions and mergers, most notably
acquisitions of stock meeting minimum “size-of-transaction” and
“size-of-person” thresholds.28 Such transactions require premerger
notifications to be filed with the federal antitrust agencies—the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.29 When
premerger notification is mandated, the parties may not consummate
the merger until a thirty-day waiting period from the day of filing has
24. Martin Pelletier, Our Nation of Oligopolies Not Good for Consumers, but Great for
Investors, FIN. POST (July 31, 2018), https://business.financialpost.com/investing/how-canadasoligopolies-have-been-big-winners-for-investors; Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1278 n.50 (pointing out
that industry definitions may be different from antitrust market definitions); Business in America:
Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/brief
ing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-giant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing.
25. The generally accepted concentration measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),
which sums the squares of each firm’s market share. Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, an
industry with an HHI above 2500 is generally considered highly concentrated. See U.S. DEP’T JUST.
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 18–19 (2010) [hereinafter
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. As explained subsequently, this regularly implies an industry
with four competitors or fewer.
26. Corporate Concentration: The Creep of Consolidation Across America’s Corporate
Landscape, ECONOMIST (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/0
3/daily-chart-13. On oligopolistic markets, see George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL.
ECON. 44 (1964).
27. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9) (2018).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a). The size-of-transaction threshold has recently been raised to $376
million, or $94 million if either the acquiring or acquired party has annual net sales or total assets
of at least $18.8 million and the other party has annual net sales or total assets of at least $188.8
million (the “person-size-threshold”). See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the
Clayton Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 7880, 7880 (Mar. 4, 2021).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d).
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elapsed.30 During this waiting period, the agencies assess whether or
not the effect of the proposed transaction may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce, as per section 7 of the Clayton Act.31 If they find the
proposed merger competitively problematic, they may attempt to
block it.32
The HSR exempts acquisitions meeting the thresholds from
premerger notification obligations when the acquirer will not hold
over 10 percent of the issuer’s voting securities, and when the
acquisition is made “solely for the purpose of investment.”33 Until
recently, this exemption was interpreted to apply to institutional
investors’ acquisition of stock for purpose of investment.34
Consequently, when institutional investors purchased stock as part of
their ordinary course of business, the purchase was effectively
immune from antitrust scrutiny. Legal doctrine echoed the economic
understanding according to which such transactions posed no
competitive harm.35
But the tide has changed. Recent academic work has argued that
the phenomenon of several institutional investors holding equity of
30. Id. § 18a(a), (b)(1)(B).
31. Id. § 18.
32. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFF., INTRODUCTORY GUIDE I: WHAT
IS THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM? AN OVERVIEW 13–14 (2009),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/premerger-introductory-guides/guide1.pdf
[hereinafter INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO PREMERGER NOTIFICATION]. In order to facilitate an
effective review, the HSR sets a statutory waiting period (thirty days for most transactions, and
fifteen days in the case of a cash tender offer or a bankruptcy sale), during which the transaction
may not be consummated. See id. at 9.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9). The HSR Rule 801.1i(1) states: “Voting securities are held or
acquired ‘solely for the purpose of investment’ if the person holding or acquiring such voting
securities has no intention of participating in the formulation, determination, or direction of the
basic business decisions of the issuer.” 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(i)(1) (2020).
34. But see Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership:
Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 562, 602–03 (2000) (contesting
the point made in 5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1203(d), at
322(1980)); David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2000). Note, however, that Gilo focuses on the anti-competitive effects of passive investments by
a single shareholder that controls one of the firms. Id. at 22–28. See also O’Brien & Salop, supra
note 34, at 585 for an analysis of horizontal joint ventures acting independently of their parents’
incentives.
35. A comprehensive account of both the case law and the enforcement policy of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission is offered by Rock & Rubinfeld, supra
note 1, at 252–58. On the ‘investment-only’ exemption, see Debbie Feinstein et al., “InvestmentOnly” Means Just That, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 24, 2015, 5:25 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/08/investment-only-means-just.
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firms that compete in oligopolistic product markets is competitively
harmful. Importantly, the argument is that institutional investors’ cross
ownership of stock in oligopolistic markets results in coordinated-like
anti-competitive pricing even if these institutional investors do not
control any of the firms in which they invest, and regardless of these
institutional investors’ conduct; that is even if they do not coordinate
amongst themselves or communicate with management in any way.36
The argument is that “no such communication or coordination is
necessary for the basic anti-competitive effect, which turns purely on
the structural incentives created by horizontal shareholdings.”37
The theory itself seems fairly straightforward: Competition
between firms in the same industry erodes total industry profits. When
institutional investors cross-own firms that compete in the same
industry, they prefer that competition between these firms be as lax as
possible. If feasible, they prefer that competition be entirely
eliminated. Economically, cross-owning institutional investors are
invested in the industry as a whole and not in a specific firm. Much
like any cross-owning shareholder, institutional cross owners gain
nothing from one portfolio firm increasing its market share at its
competitors’ expense. They thus have nothing to gain and everything
to lose from price reductions, and prefer that competition between
portfolio firms be eradicated. That much is true for any cross owner of
stock. However, institutional investors are unique in an important
aspect. In addition to their interest in lax competition, their holdings
are publicly known38 and they are prominent market players. Portfolio
firms’ managements are aware that they are owned by shareholders
who have stake in the firm’s competitor (or competitors) as well. Even
if nothing is communicated from the institutional investors, and even
if these investors do not control the firms or instruct management,
managers realize that their shareholders want them to compete less
vigorously, and relax competition. In other settings of cross

36. See O’Brien & Salop, supra note 34, at 568; Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1558; Posner et
al., supra note 2, at 676; Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1270.
37. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1274.
38. When the investors are index funds, their holdings are obvious to all. Even if they are not,
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require all institutional investors to disclose all
their holdings quarterly. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2012); Form 13F—Reports Filed by Institutional
Investment Managers, INVESTOR.GOV: U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.investor.gov/in
troduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/form-13f-reports-filed-institutional-investment
(last visited Feb. 21, 2021); see Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 221.
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ownership, managements do not necessarily know who their noncontrolling shareholders are, because these are anonymous investors.
Even if managements know who their own shareholders are, they do
not know who their competitors’ shareholders are. Thus, under regular
circumstances, cross ownership will have no adverse impact on
competition, unless the shareholders’ preferences are expressly
communicated, and management is instructed to not compete
accordingly. By contrast, when institutional investors cross-own,
competition between portfolio firms is spontaneously chilled. The
theory itself is intuitive, and its underpinnings have attracted very little
attention.
The hypothesis that cross ownership by institutional investors
dampens competition was supported by an influential empirical
article. Azar et al., focusing on the airline industry, attempted to assess
the effect of a change in shareholder-level concentration on ticket
prices.39 They utilized a “natural shock”—a merger between
institutional investors that hold stock in the airline industry—to gauge
the effect of a change in shareholder-level concentration on ticket
prices.40 They found that following BlackRock’s acquisition of
Barclays Global Investors, airline ticket prices increased by 3 percent
to 7 percent.41 Given the approximately 4 percent profitability in the
industry, this is a significant change.42 It implies that profitability
increased by anything between 75 percent to 175 percent as a result of
a change in shareholder-level concentration, with no apparent change
in concentration in the industry itself.43
The empirical findings were soon challenged by two sets of
empirical articles. The first set of articles strikes at the original study
itself, and challenges the study’s methodology and conclusions. The
second set offers independent findings that are in opposition to those
of the original study. Daniel O’Brien and Keith Waehrer,44 Edward

39. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1514.
40. Id. at 1535.
41. Id. at 1517–18.
42. Id. at 1517.
43. The authors used a modified measurement of concentration that accounts for ownershipconcentration (a modified HHI, “MHHI”), originally developed in O’Brien & Salop, supra note
34.
44. Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership:
We Know Less Than We Think (Feb. 22, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2922677 (unpublished paper).
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Rock and Daniel Rubinfeld,45 and Scott Hemphill and Marcel Kahan46
all challenged the methodology of the original empirical study.47
Kennedy et al. conducted an independent study of the same industry
while addressing the methodological issues identified in the key
empirical research.48 Their study found no effect of common
ownership on prices.49 Similarly, Gramlich and Grundl conducted an
independent study focusing on the banking industry,50 another
industry in which an empirical study initially found supra-competitive
profits associated with shareholder-level concentration.51 Gramlich
and Grundl found mixed, although preliminary, results.52 The
empirical pendulum has thus begun to swing back. But
notwithstanding the state of the empirical research, the underlying
theory of competitive harm remains unchallenged. Despite the
empirical findings, the theory is considered compelling, and is heavily
relied on.53
Naturally, the recent economic analyses suggesting that passive
cross ownership has an anti-competitive structural effect have been
supplemented by legal arguments suggesting that institutional
investors’ common ownership of oligopolistic firms’ stock should
require premerger filing and antitrust scrutiny even when these are
passive investments. 54 It has been argued that the ‘investment-only’
exemption afforded by the HSR can and should be interpreted to be
inapplicable to such acquisitions.55
The academic writings challenging institutional investors’
business model have already begun to impact enforcement agencies.
These writings have found a willing ear at the federal antitrust

45. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1.
46. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18.
47. The original empirical study by Azar et al. was first available in 2014, when the authors
posted it on Social Science Research Network.
48. Kennedy et al., supra note 1.
49. Id. at 22.
50. Jacob Gramlich & Serafin Grundl, Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common
Ownership (Divs. Rsch. & Stat. & Monetary Affs., Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics
Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2017-029, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940137.
51. José Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition 1 (May 4, 2019),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 (unpublished paper).
52. Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at 1.
53. E.g., Elhauge, supra note 5; Posner et al., supra note 2.
54. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1309–12.
55. Id. at 1301–14; Posner et al., supra note 2, at 678.
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agencies—the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission. These agencies have begun to investigate
instances of cross ownership in several industries. 56 The investigations
themselves are a potential attack on the entire system of mutual
fund holdings,57 given institutional investors’ sensitivity to
controversy and scandals.58 If action is taken following these
investigations, this will clearly force institutional investors to alter
their competitive strategy. The European Commission has done even
more than investigate instances of cross ownership. It has recently
blocked a merger between Dow and Du Pont based, inter alia, on the
recent theory of competitive harm.59 In fact, the European
Commission seems to have even extended the theory of competitive
harm, explaining that “[w]hile the economic literature has, to the best
of the Commission’s knowledge, focused on the effects of cross
shareholding and common shareholding on price competition, the
economic rationale of such effects applies to innovation
competition.”60
The now-prevalent view that passive investments by institutional
investors is competitively harmful has even brought about suggestions
to limit institutional investors’ diversification, limiting them to either
owning stock in no more than one firm per (oligopolistic) industry, or
holding stock not exceeding 1 percent of the total value of any
(oligopolistic) industry.61 Such proposals, if adopted, will adversely
affect diversification, and significantly increase institutional
investors’ portfolios’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk.62
This Article develops a new understanding of the market forces
at play. It argues that the competitive concerns are misplaced, and that

56. Kennedy et al., supra note 1, at 2 n.4; Solomon, supra note 1. Although at least one of
these investigations has apparently been abandoned. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 275–
77.
57. Solomon, supra note 1.
58. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1435, 1442.
59. Case C-M.7932, Dow/DuPont, at 1, 28 n.85, Annex 5 (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf.
60. Id. at 383.
61. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 708; see also Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 263–67
(discussing alternatives to Posner et al.’s suggestions to limit institutional investors’
diversification).
62. Although Posner et al. argue that much of this exposure may be mitigated. See Posner et
al., supra note 2, at 710–11.
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antitrust law should not deal with institutional investors’ purely
passive investments at all.
Specifically, the Article explains that common ownership of stock
does not harm competition in any way. The key reason for this is that
common ownership by non-controlling institutional investors cannot
incentivize managers to compete any less vigorously than they would
have absent common ownership. Cross ownership can adversely
impact competition only if institutional investors coordinate between
themselves and communicate with portfolio firms in a very elaborate
manner. Such coordination is neither alleged in the recent academic
writings nor likely given the potential criminal liability and
reputational cost associated with it. If managers are not spontaneously
incentivized to complete less vigorously and are not explicitly
instructed to do so, their competitive conduct will remain intact. Thus,
passive (non-controlling) common ownership of stock does not
worsen the competitive situation in any way. Spontaneous harm to
competition is impossible. In fact, cross ownership safeguards against
competitive harm of the kind argued for in the recent literature.
The key observation developed in this Article is that in addition
to increasing total industry profits, anti-competitive conduct of the
kind argued for in the recent literature entails an additional inseparable
element—the tunneling element. When firms engage in anticompetitive coordination of the kind envisaged by the recent literature,
they not only increase total industry profits. They also tunnel all of
these profits to one of the firms. This is a unique feature of the anticompetitive conduct argued for in the recent literature. In all other
anti-competitive settings, all coordinating firms gain from the anticompetitive conduct. The unique tunneling feature has important
implications for the analysis of the anti-competitive potential. It makes
spontaneous competitive harm unlikely, because some of the firms in
the industry will lose from the coordinated conduct.
As an illustrative example, we may consider two competitors,
firm A and firm B, both of which sell an identical product for the
competitive price of one dollar per unit. If they form a cartel, they can
each profitably sell the product for three dollars per unit. The price
increase will not result in loss of sales to the competitor (whose price
will not be more attractive to consumers). A cartel will benefit both
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coordinating firms to the tune of two dollars per unit.63 By contrast, in
the anti-competitive setting envisaged by the recent theory of
competitive harm, one of the competitors, firm A for example,
increases its price to a level that is unprofitable for it (say, four dollars
per unit), so that firm B may then profitably charge the monopoly price
of three dollars per unit. From an overall industry perspective, the
outcome is indeed similar to a cartel or a monopoly: The product will
be sold to consumers for three dollars per unit, and industry profits
will be maximized. From the joint shareholder’s (or shareholders’)
perspective, such a result is even superior to that of an outright cartel.
The joint shareholders will want managements to conduct themselves
so that profits to flow to the firm in which the shareholders’ holdings
are greater—firm B in the preceding example. Through their larger
holdings in the firm to which profits are tunneled (firm B), the
shareholders will accrue a larger portion of the industry’s rents. But
importantly, the strategy is unprofitable from firm A’s perspective. It
will make no sales at the price of four dollars. Firm A must lose, so
that firm B profits.
The anti-competitive conduct identified by the recent literature is
thus markedly different from all other anti-competitive pricing
settings. In all other long-recognized settings of anti-competitive
pricing, all coordinating firms profit from coordination. Whether the
coordination takes the form of an outright cartel, a merger, or tacit
collusion,64 all coordinating (or merging) firms’ profits are increased
as a direct consequence of the elimination of competition.65 By
contrast, in the setting of passive cross ownership, all firms in the
industry but one lose from the anti-competitive conduct. They are even
worse off than they would have been under perfect competition. Not
only the additional profits, but all industry profits are tunneled to one
of the firms in the industry.
63. Firms in a cartel will also lose some sales, because elevated prices will price some
consumers out of the market. Thus, the cartelistic firms will need to balance the additional two
dollars per unit against the forgone profits. But this does not alter the core analysis. It complicates
the computation of overall gains, but the overall effect on the firms’ profits will be positive. For an
elaborate account of the difficulties in assessing the precise effects of cartels on prices, quantities,
and profits, see DAVID ASHTON & DAVID HENRY, COMPETITION DAMAGES ACTIONS IN THE EU:
LAW AND PRACTICE 213–19 (2013).
64. On tacit collusion, see generally Stigler, supra note 26 (discussing factors that govern the
practicability of tacit collusion).
65. On the similarity between oligopolies and cartels, see Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and
the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1566–75 (1969).
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To be sure, as the tunneling effect accompanies an increase in
total industry profits, there is scope for a mutually beneficial
arrangement. The firm that directly benefits from the scheme, or the
joint shareholder, may make payments to the other firms (or to their
managements), thus incentivizing them to participate in the scheme.
But the point is precisely that such an elaborate compensation
mechanism is necessary. It must be negotiated and communicated to
the managements and shareholders of the losing firms. Cross
ownership cannot spontaneously harm competition. The implication
of this observation on the likelihood of the scenario is dramatic and
goes far beyond the mere technical issue of reaching an agreement.
Both communicating with management on these issues and
management’s acquiescence would violate antitrust laws as well as
corporate fiduciary duties.66 And institutional investors’ sensitivity to
scandals and criminal offenses makes them much less likely than
others to participate in such a scheme. In any event, unless both
managements and institutional investors are willing to take the risk of
severe criminal sanctions, competition cannot be harmed in any way.
Spontaneous harm to competition is certainly not a concern.
A helpful analogy may be the difference between standard pricefixing cartels and bid-rigging cartels.67 In a price fixing cartel, all
cartel members directly profit from the cartel. They all share in the
cartelistic rents. In a bid-rigging cartel, by contrast, only the bidder
that is allocated the specific bid directly gains from the cartel. It wins
the bid at prices that are more favorable to it than had it competed. But
the immediate effect of a bid-rigging cartel on all other cartel members
is negative. They lose the bid. This does not suggest, of course, that
bid-rigging cartels are impossible. They can, and do, exist. But they
require some agreed mechanism through which the losing cartel
members are compensated by the cartel member that wins the bid,
thereby conquering the entire market at a monopoly price.68 In some
bid-rigging cartels the winning cartel member will make direct
payments to other cartel members. In other bid-rigging cartels
compensation takes the form of shielding the losing cartel members
from competition in future bids by allocating future bids to these cartel
66. See infra text accompanying notes 132–39.
67. See ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION:
CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS 29–54, 55–70 (2012).
68. Id. at 25.
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members. Regardless of the precise compensation technique,
spontaneous bid rigging is impossible. Similarly, in the scenario
envisaged by the recent literature all firms but one lose from the
coordinated conduct. A scheme for compensating them must therefore
be put in place. Spontaneous harm to competition is unlikely.
The idea of spontaneous competitive harm is, in fact, even less
persuasive than the analogy to bid rigging suggests. This is due to the
fact that it is not a single shareholder who cross-owns portfolio firms,
but several institutional investors. The difference in these institutional
investors’ holdings guarantees that if one institutional investor
benefits from the scheme, another institutional investor will lose. As
subsequently explained in detail, in all of the industries surveyed in
the empirical studies, some institutional investors’ holdings were
larger in one portfolio firm, while other institutional investors had
larger stakes in other portfolio firms.69 Thus, any conduct that tunneled
profits to the benefit of one institutional investor would have
simultaneously harmed other institutional investors. The scheme
would harm the majority of the prominent shareholders—precisely
those shareholders that managements presumably want to benefit.
Another layer of complication is introduced. Not only are managers
ill-incentivized to participate in the scheme, they also cannot
spontaneously realize which institutional investor they are to serve,
and which they are to alienate. The fact that there are many
institutional investors who cross-own further frustrates any possibility
of spontaneous harm.
Once again, an agreement could theoretically be struck between
institutional investors according to which the benefitting institutional
investor compensates the losing institutional investors. But such an
agreement would, as explained, be an outright criminal offense, which
institutional investors are unlikely to engage in. In any event,
spontaneous coordination is impossible. Perhaps counter-intuitively,
cross ownership by several institutional investors actually safeguards
against any spontaneous anti-competitive outcome.
Finally, spontaneous competitive harm is less likely not only due
to lack of (managerial) incentive and due to other shareholders’
expected retaliation, but also due to the difficulty of reaching an
equilibrium without explicit coordination, which, again, is neither
69. See infra text accompanying notes 150–65.
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alleged nor likely.70 Under standard coordination, all firms must price
at the monopoly price that optimizes industry profits (three dollars in
the numeric example previously used).71 This price is known to all
firms in the industry. Coordination is thus relatively simple.72 By
contrast, the anti-competitive setting envisioned by the recent theory
of competitive harm requires differential pricing, with some firms
pricing at supra-monopolistic levels, and others pricing at the
monopoly level. This requires a far more complex and elaborate
agreement. Firms must agree on which firms will price at one price
and which will price at another. Another layer of complexity is
introduced, again complicating any hope of spontaneous coordination.
The theory developed in this Article helps understand the findings
of the recent empirical studies. As mentioned, the most recent
empirical studies find no correlation between shareholder-level
concentration and prices. These findings are puzzling, given what
seems to be an infallible theory of competitive harm. The recent
empirical studies and the theory developed in this Article reinforce one
another.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part I
introduces the now-prevailing view according to which the crossownership phenomenon is harmful to competition; Part II develops the
key hypothesis of this Article. It challenges the arguments presented
in Part I and attempts to demonstrate that there are no anti-competitive
outcomes that are attributable to truly passive common ownership of
stock. Part III discusses the empirical evidence. It reviews the criticism
launched by O’Brien and Waehrer, Rock and Rubinfeld, and Hemphill
and Kahan against the original empirical studies finding a correlation
between shareholder-level concentration and industry profits. It also
reviews the newer (opposite) findings. While additional empirical
work is undoubtedly called for, the theory advanced in the current
Article seems well supported by the most recent empirical studies and
helps explain these findings. Part IV offers a brief conclusion.

70. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1409, 1435.
71. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE §§ 1.2, 4.1 (5th ed. 2016).
72. Adherence and compliance are undoubtedly an issue because each firm has an inherent
incentive to cheat on the cartel. Id. § 4.1. But at least the first element of coordination—setting
prices, whether through an explicit agreement or through tacit collusion—is simple.
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I. THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE HARM
In order to understand the theory of competitive harm it is helpful
to begin with the setting of a single retail investor holding stakes in
competing firms, and then proceed to the more complicated setting of
a single passive, non-controlling investor with cross holding in
competing firms. Building on the analyses of these two settings, the
more complex setting of several passive investors with noncontrolling stakes in competing firms can then be introduced and
analyzed. This step-by-step analysis will help reveal the shortcomings
of the hypothesis regarding cross ownership and its anti-competitive
potential.
Before proceeding, a preliminary note with respect to the
structure of the product market is in order. The hypothesis developed
in the literature is that cross ownership brings about spontaneous
competitive harm in oligopolistic product market industries.73 The
term ‘oligopolistic industry’ is an imprecise economic term. Industrial
organization theory predicts that, all else equal, the intensity of
competition will decrease as the number of competitors decreases.74
But the precise price and output levels depend on a host of additional
factors, making it impossible to accurately predict real life outcomes.75
As a workable tool, the federal antitrust agencies use a widely
accepted concentration index, the HHI,76 which is based on the
number of competitors and on their respective market shares, to
determine whether an industry is unconcentrated, moderately
concentrated, or highly concentrated.77 For all practical purposes, we

73. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 19. But see Posner et al.’s point
regarding markets with HHI’s that are lower than 2,500, but with relatively high MHHI’s (at 24).
Posner et al., supra note 2, at 697–98. On the MHHI, see infra text accompanying note 178.
74. Stigler, supra note 26, at 57.
75. Id. at 48.
76. But see Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 487 n.99
(2010) (arguing the HHI is not always an accurate indicator of when mergers will result in enhanced
market power and increased prices). For a competing view, see Malcom B. Coate & Joseph J.
Simons, In Defense of Market Definition, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (2012) and Duncan Cameron
et al., Good Riddance to Market Definition?, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 719 (2012). For Professor
Kaplow’s response to several commentators, see Louis Kaplow, Market Definition Alchemy, 57
ANTITRUST BULL. 915, (2012) and Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57
ANTITRUST BULL. 887, 904–11 (2012) (discussing Professor Kaplow’s work and the “disconnect
between merger analysis and articulated merger goals”). Despite the nearly decade-old challenges
to market definition, it continues to be employed by the federal antitrust agencies.
77. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 18–19. The guidelines explicitly
state that market shares and the tentative thresholds cannot be the end of the analysis:
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may regard an oligopolistic industry as one with four major
competitors or fewer.78 Following the analyses developed in recent
writings, this Article too focuses on product markets in which
competition is of an oligopolistic nature. For ease of exposition, I
normally use the case of a product-market duopoly—a two-firm
industry. The analysis is equally applicable to other highly
concentrated markets.79

The purpose of these thresholds is not to provide a rigid screen to separate competitively
benign mergers from anticompetitive ones, although high levels of concentration do raise
concerns. Rather, they provide one way to identify some mergers unlikely to raise
competitive concerns and some others for which it is particularly important to examine
whether other competitive factors confirm, reinforce, or counteract the potentially
harmful effects of increased concentration.
Id. at 19.
78. According to the HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, industries with HHIs of 2,500 and
higher are considered highly concentrated. Id. Mathematically, an HHI of over 2,500 normally
means that there are four or fewer major firms in the market, Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1277,
although theoretically an industry with over four competitors may have an HHI of over 2,500, and
this becomes more likely as the disparity in market shares increases.
79. Of course, the “but-for” quantity-price equilibria might be different; that is, the
equilibrium in a three-firm oligopoly may be different than the equilibrium in a duopoly or a fourfirm industry. The different equilibria would depend not only on the number of competitors, but
also on the nature of competition in the industry. See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 239–76 (1988) (analyzing how repeated interactions impact
competition). But in terms of the effect common ownership has on competition, the analysis is no
different.
Closely related, the analysis developed in this Article is not to be taken to suggest that markets in
which institutional investors are found to commonly own stock are necessarily competitive.
Regardless of common ownership, tacit collusion, which is generally legal, see Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir.
2015), occurs in concentrated product markets. Neither the existence of tacit collusion nor the
concomitant supra-competitive pricing is in any way challenged. Moreover, there might even be
reason to expect firms in oligopolistic markets to be over-represented in institutional investors’
portfolios. Firms in relatively stable oligopolies can be expected to generate supra-competitive
profits. If capital markets function perfectly, this should not make the stock of such firms a better
investment opportunity. The supra-competitive rents should be reflected in the price at which the
oligopolistic firms’ stock is traded, making the stock as lucrative as other firms’ stock in terms of
the expected return on investment. Excessive product-market profits do not necessarily imply
excessive returns on investment in the firms’ stock. But if there is any element requiring expertise
in appraising the value of the stock—e.g., the likelihood of regulatory action or inaction, the
probability of emerging competition, etc.—institutional investors may be better situated than less
sophisticated (certainly lay) investors to identify these opportunities, which may result in overrepresentation of such firms in institutional investors’ portfolio. On the efficient-market hypothesis,
see generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (discussing various tests and evidence that support the efficient-markets
model). This Article does not suggest in any way that firms in which institutional investors invest
are typically in fierce product-market competition. But the argument advanced in the recent
literature is that when the product market is oligopolistic, common ownership exacerbates the anti-
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A. The Case of a Single Active Investor
We may begin by focusing on a single retail investor, who
monitors his or her investment and controls the respective
managements of the firms in which he or she is invested. When such
an investor diversifies his or her investment across competing firms,
the competitive concern is straightforward: Any investor that has a
stake in two or more competitors will naturally prefer lax competition
between these competitors. The investor’s overall profits are
maximized if the firms do not compete. An investor that has full
control of two competing firms can obviously be expected to prevent
all competition between the two firms. It will order the two firms to
conduct themselves as if they were one, restricting output and raising
prices to the monopolistic level.80 This is equally true for an investor
that controls several firms in the same industry. Firms under joint
control will conduct themselves as if they were a single fully merged
firm.
It is important to note that the joint controlling shareholder need
not hold all outstanding stock of the firms, or even most of their stock,
for this anti-competitive outcome. The threshold for control is lower
the more dispersed ownership is.81 At times, control may be achieved
with relatively small holdings in one or more of the firms.82 Regardless
of the threshold for control, firms under common control are, from a
competitive perspective, very similar to a single merged firm.
Closely related, cross holdings may also facilitate cartel-like
conduct even absent control. This may be facilitated through exchange
of information and collusion, neither of which require control. A
shareholder that has a representative on the board of directors of each
of the firms may be able to transfer competitively sensitive
information from one firm to the other,83 and even explicitly
coordinate pricing and output. Such conduct does not require control.
In fact, such collusion may be possible even if each of the respective
competitive outcome by inducing what I will refer to as “unilateral coordination.” And this Article
argues that they do not.
80. See Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, EC Competition Law and the Regulation of Passive
Investments Among Competitors, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 331–34 (2006).
81. See O’Brien & Salop, supra note 34, at 570.
82. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 270.
83. Sharing of information would generally be considered a “plus factor,” tending to make
tacit collusion, otherwise legitimate, actionable. See William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and
Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 435 (2011).
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firms has a controlling shareholder that is not the joint shareholder.
Other shareholders also benefit from the elimination of competition
and from supra-competitive pricing. The joint shareholder is, in this
setting, benefitting not only herself, but also all shareholders of both
firms. Other shareholders have little reason to object to coordination
or prevent it.84
A single, active, controlling shareholder that holds stock of two
or more competitors may thus bring about a merger-like anticompetitive outcome. And a single, active, non-controlling
shareholder that holds shares in two or more competitors may facilitate
collusion, whether tacit collusion or outright cartels.
These kinds of anti-competitive outcomes are neither novel nor
controversial. Antitrust law is, and has long been, well-equipped to
deal with them. The first kind, cross holding that results in merger-like
outcomes, is the main focal point of the rules regulating merger control
as set out in the Clayton Act85 and the HSR. Merger control is aimed
at preventing harm to competition in its incipiency.86 As mentioned,
acquisition of shares in a firm meeting some threshold by a
shareholder of a competing firm will normally require scrutiny by
antitrust authorities, as per the HSR.87 This scrutiny is in place
precisely to facilitate identification of anti-competitive potential of the
kind described here. If the effect of the acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce or in any

84. Even if the shareholder does not facilitate direct coordination, the mere fact that such a
joint shareholder exists may provide both firms with comfort that inexplicit anti-competitive
messages are received. Consider the following example: firm A is considering a price increase that
will only be profitable if firm B also raises prices (otherwise firm B will capture all sales). Firm A
wants to raise prices, hoping that firm B will follow suit. Under regular circumstances, firm A
cannot be sure that firm B will understand that if it does not follow suit, A’s prices will be lowered.
A joint board member—or a joint shareholder who communicates with his representatives on the
respective boards—may be helpful in ensuring that the strategy is made known to the competitor,
which can then be expected to cooperate even absent an explicit agreement to do so. Uncertainty,
which challenges most tacit collusion situations, is resolved or mitigated through the joint
shareholder.
85. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53).
86. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962); HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 1, 25. For an account of actual enforcement actions and trends, see
Am. Antitrust Inst., Mergers, Market Power, and the Need for More Vigorous Enforcement
(Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/mergerfinal.pdf
(preview of a chapter from unpublished 2016 Presidential Transition Report).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2018); INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO PREMERGER NOTIFICATION,
supra note 32.
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activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the agencies
will challenge the merger.88
The second kind of potential competitive harm, the facilitation of
explicit or tacit collusion by a non-controlling shareholder, is also
well-addressed by antitrust law. An increased likelihood of postmerger collusion may bring about both an objection to a specific deal
under the Clayton Act (when the deal requires premerger approval)
and post-merger scrutiny under the Sherman Act (if the deal does not
require approval).89 The Clayton Act addresses such concerns in the
same way it addresses the concerns associated with a joint controlling
shareholder. It preempts the competitive harm ex ante, by enjoining
the transaction.90 The Sherman Act91 combats such collusion ex post,
i.e., when such collusion has already been made possible, whether
through a merger or through market characteristics. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits horizontal collusion and makes it a criminal
offense.92 This is well established antitrust doctrine.93
B. The Case of a Single Passive Investor
The analysis is slightly complicated when the joint shareholder
controls one of the firms but is a non-controlling passive shareholder
in the other. This is taken to mean that the investor neither dictates the
non-controlled firm’s conduct, nor delivers information (or explicitly

88. See 15 U.S.C. § 19.
89. On the forward-looking nature of merger control, see sources cited supra note 86; Deborah
L. Feinstein, Director, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Speech at Advanced U.S.
Antitrust Conference, San Francisco: The Forward-Looking Nature of Merger Analysis 1–3 (2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/forward-looking-nature-mergeranalysis/140206mergeranalysis-dlf.pdf.
90. 16 C.F.R. §§ 801, 802, 803 (2020); INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO PREMERGER
NOTIFICATION, supra note 32, at 13–14.
91. Sherman Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7).
92. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), overruled by
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The case may have been decided
differently today under the single-economic-entity doctrine. See BJÖRN LUNDQVIST, JOINT
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER US ANTITRUST AND EU COMPETITION LAW 33–34
(2015); see also Competition Act 1998, c. 41 (Eng.).
93. On the analysis of this scenario, referred to as the “cartel ringmaster” scenario, and on the
relevant case law establishing that such conduct constitutes an antitrust offense under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, see Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 222–24, 226–28. Although focusing on
the hypothetical of a portfolio manager of a fund, the analysis is equally applicable to any crossholding “ringmaster.”
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coordinates) between the firms.94 It controls and guides only the
controlled firm.
Ostensibly, the firms’ competitive conduct should remain intact
despite the cross holding. Their conduct is not guided by the same
shareholder, and there is no coordination between them. Nonetheless,
and although less straightforward, scholars have identified anticompetitive potential associated with such cross-shareholding as well.
Professor Gilo refers to the case in which a firm’s controller invests in
the firm’s competitor as “passive investment by controllers.”95 He
shows that under such circumstances, the controller has both the
incentive and the ability to stifle competition.96 If the controller’s
financial interest in the non-controlled firm is larger than her financial
interest in the controlled firm, the controller will have a preference for
profits to flow from the controlled firm to the non-controlled firm.97
As she controls the firm from which she wants profits to flow, the
controller will cause that firm to raise prices or otherwise conduct
itself so that profits flow to the firm in which her holdings are
greater.98
Consider the following example: Firm A and firm B are
competitors. A shareholder owns 10 percent of firm A’s outstanding
stock. She controls this firm, because ownership of the firm is
dispersed, and no other shareholder owns any more than a trivial
amount of firm A’s stock. The same shareholder also owns 15 percent
of firm B’s outstanding stock. But she does not control firm B, because
other shareholders own large portions of firm B’s stock. The
shareholder clearly prefers profits and sales to be diverted from firm
A to firm B. For every dollar diverted from firm A to firm B, this
shareholder’s profits are increased by five cents (15 percent to 10
percent). Although she cannot affect firm B’s conduct, the shareholder
controls firm A. Firm A’s management can be instructed to raise the
price firm A charges for the product, so that consumers shift demand
to firm B.
The general observation is that as long as there is any difference
between the financial stakes the shareholder has in each of the firms,
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See sources cited supra note 36.
Gilo, supra note 34, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22–23.
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the shareholder will have a preference for profits to flow to the firm in
which his or her financial stake is greater. If the financial holdings in
the controlled firm are smaller than the financial stakes in the noncontrolled competitor, the anti-competitive conduct becomes likely.
As Gilo summarizes:
[W]hen a firm’s controller (be it a parent corporation or an
individual) invests in the firm’s competitor, in addition to the
controller’s stake in the competitor, the controller’s stake in
the firm it controls becomes important. The smaller the
controller’s stake in the firm it controls, the less aggressively
will the controller cause the firm it controls to compete. This
is because, the smaller the controller’s stake in the firm it
controls, the more weight the controller places on its stake in
the competing firm. This further implies that even relatively
small stakes the controller holds in the competing firm could
substantially lessen competition if the controller has a diluted
stake in the firm it controls.99
Importantly, this analysis requires no collusion or even
communication between the firms or their respective managements.
Even absent collusion and communication, cross-investment has anticompetitive potential. The controller can be expected to cause the
controlled firm to forego competition (and profit) so as to allow the
competing firm (in which the controller has a greater financial stake)
to reap the benefits.100
An extremely important observation for the argument presented
in this Article is that there is a stark difference between the two settings
discussed thus far—the “classic” setting (in which the same
shareholder controls both firms and exerts this control to relax
competition) and the setting in which the shareholder controls only
one of the firms (in which the shareholder’s holdings are smaller).
In the first setting of a joint, active, shareholder, both coordinating
firms’ profits are increased as compared to the no-coordination
(competitive) counterfactual. Whether the shareholder controls the
firms, thereby forming a de facto merger, or controls neither firm but
acts as a coordinator, thereby forming a cartel (from an economic

99. Gilo, supra note 34, at 25 (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 5; see also Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1270 (explaining that this anticompetitive effect
will occur even absent communication or coordination between managers of firms).
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perspective),101 both firms’ profits are increased through the
elimination of competition between them.
In the second setting, in which the controller controls one firm but
has a (passive, but greater) financial stake in the other firm, the
controlled firm loses from the anti-competitive “coordination.” It loses
sales to its competitor, so that its competitor (in which the controller
has a larger financial stake) may reap the benefits of this loss by
charging monopoly prices. The controlled firm must raise its prices to
levels exceeding the optimal monopoly price, an increase which is
unprofitable by definition, so that its competitor may then profitably
charge monopoly prices, thereby maximizing its own profits.102 The
analysis of this second setting must be sensitive to the idea that one of
the “coordinating” firms loses as a result of the “coordinated” conduct.
This is acknowledged by both Gilo and O’Brien and Salop.103
This observation will prove key for the analysis developed in this
Article. For want of a better term, we may refer to the conduct of the
firms in the latter setting of a joint shareholder who controls only one
of the firms using the oxymoron “unilateral coordination.” Price levels
in the industry are similar to those that would have prevailed under
explicit coordination (monopoly prices). But only one of the firms, the
one controlled by the joint shareholder, “coordinates” in the sense that
it considers the effects of its own pricing on its competitor’s
profitability. The other firm, the one not controlled by the joint
101. From a legal standpoint, this economic cartel may be permissible. If both firms are fully
controlled by the same controller, they may be “incapable of conspiring . . . for purposes of § 1 of
the Sherman Act.” Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984). Copperweld
established what is known as the single-entity defense doctrine. Id. at 752. Note, however, that the
Copperweld rule applies to a conspiracy alleged between a parent company and its wholly owned
subsidiary. Id. The precise contours of the single-entity defense are unclear outside the
paradigmatic setting of a parent company and a wholly owned subsidiary. For an account of
subsequent case law, see Dean V. Williamson, Organization, Control, and the Single Entity
Defense in Antitrust (U.S. Dep’t Just., Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No.
EAG 06-4, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/09/28/221876.pdf.
102. This kind of anti-competitive effect corresponds to what is referred to in merger control
as “unilateral effects,” or the “recapture effect.” See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 25, at 20–24. The specific kind of unilateral effect that is relevant to the present context is the
one discussed in section 6.1 of the HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES. See also Posner et al., supra
note 2, at 682.
103. Gilo, supra note 34, at 5; O’Brien & Salop, supra note 34, at 568. O’Brien and Salop
acknowledge this point, and explicitly make the distinction between financial interest and corporate
control. See id. at 569. They tie their analysis to the seminal work of Berle and Means on the
separation of ownership and control and its implications on the performance of an individual
corporation. Id. at 563–64 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)).
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shareholder, does not coordinate in any meaningful sense. It does not
consider the effects of the coordination on its competitor’s profits. It
simply responds to its competitor’s elevated prices, which allow it to
profitably elevate its own prices to the monopolistic levels.104
Unilateral coordination is very different not only from the
previous scenarios of a de facto merger (a single controller directing
both firms’ conduct) or a cartel, but also from standard tacit collusion.
Much like a de facto merger and a cartel, tacit collusion benefits both
coordinating firms.105 Under the regular oligopolistic setting, one firm
raises its price (or otherwise conducts itself) attempting to signal the
other firm to do the same. If the other firm does not reciprocate, the
first firm returns to the competitive (or pre-collusion) prices, leaving
neither firm better off.106 If the other firm reciprocates, both firms are
better off than they would have been had they competed.107 By
contrast, in the setting of unilateral coordination, the unilaterally
coordinating firm is worse off than it would have been under
competition, regardless of its competitor’s response. Tacit collusion
and unilateral coordination are similar in the sense that one firm may
raise prices to the benefit of the other firm without having coordinated
explicitly with the other firm. But the two phenomena are nonetheless
very different. The former is engaged in for the benefit of the firm
engaging in it.108 The latter is engaged in for the opposite reason.
By way of summary, it is helpful to consider the outcome under
four different settings in a hypothetical two-firm industry, in which the
competitive return is two dollars, duopoly rents are four dollars, and
monopoly rents are six dollars.
Under competition, both firms will split the competitive return.
Each will enjoy a return of one dollar. Under duopoly, both firms will
tacitly collude and split (duopoly) rents of four dollars, for a return of
104. Or to its competitors’ elevated prices, if the industry is not a duopoly.
105. And, indeed, the second kind of competitive concern associated with mergers is
coordinated effects of the merger (i.e., its facilitation of coordinated conduct). See HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 24–27; Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and
Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
135, 137 (2002).
106. See Edward J. Green et. al, Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Robert D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014)
(analyzing the benefits and possibilities of tacit collusion among firms).
107. See Michael K. Vaska, Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the
Boundary, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 508, 510 (1985); Baker, supra note 105, at 137–38.
108. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 222.
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two dollars per firm. Under a de facto merger (joint control), both
firms will sell for the monopoly price and split the monopoly rents of
six dollars, for a return of three dollars per firm. Under unilateral
coordination, the unilaterally coordinating firm (the controlled firm)
will sell for a price that exceeds the monopoly price (say, four dollars),
allowing the firm in which the controller has a larger financial interest
to profitably charge the monopoly price. All monopoly rents (six
dollars) will accrue to the second firm, and the first firm will have
made no sales. These results are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1
Competitive Setting

Total Industry
Profits

Firm A’s
Profits

Firm B’s
Profits

Competition

$2

$1

$1

Duopoly

$4

$2

$2

Merger/Cartel

$6

$3

$3

Unilateral
Coordination

$6

$0

$6

In conformity with standard economic analysis, both firms find
monopoly rents, which are the outcome of explicit coordination or a
de facto merger, superior to duopoly rents, which are in turn superior
to the competitive outcome. However, unilateral coordination is an
improvement compared to all other possibilities from firm B’s
perspective. Under unilateral coordination, all (not only a share of)
monopoly rents accrue to it. By contrast, from firm A’s perspective,
unilateral coordination is inferior not only to a de facto merger and to
duopoly pricing, but even to perfect competition. Firm A’s only
rationale for engaging in unilateral coordination is its controller’s
instructions.
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C. The Case of Several Passive Investors
The final development in the theory of competitive harm is fairly
recent, and it is this development that is at the heart of this Article.
Recent scholarly work has extended the analysis to situations in which
the competing firms are jointly held by several investors, most
commonly institutional investors, even if these investors control
neither of the firms and do not coordinate amongst themselves.109
The analysis seems like a straightforward extension of the
unilateral coordination scenario. Instead of a single shareholder,
several institutional investors jointly function as a single joint
shareholder (in the sense that management seeks to serve their
interests). The analysis is duplicated. Rather than a single shareholder
owning stock of both firm A and firm B, we may think of two
institutional investors, X and Y, who each own stock of both firm A
and firm B. Their joint interest is to curtail competition between the
competing portfolio firms (A and B), much like the single shareholder
in the previous examples. Eliminating competition is seemingly even
simpler than in the previous examples, because when the joint
shareholder is a private shareholder, management does not necessarily
know that the shareholder also owns stock in a competitor. In order
for management to conduct itself anti-competitively, the shareholder’s
interest in the competitor needs to be communicated to at least one of
the firms’ managements. By contrast, institutional investors’ holdings
are publicly known.110 Naturally, they are also known to the managers
of the companies that are in these institutional investors’ portfolios.
Consequently, “no such communication or coordination is necessary
for the basic anticompetitive effect, which turns purely on structural
incentives created by the interlocking shareholdings.”111
Managements have no difficulty realizing the interest of their
(joint) shareholders, and thus compete less vigorously. The
competitive result is similar to the anti-competitive result discussed
earlier.
109. Professor Elhauge argues that if the product market is relatively concentrated, then
“[w]hen the same set of institutional investors has large, leading stock holdings across such a
concentrated product market, their horizontal shareholdings are likely to be problematic.” Elhauge,
supra note 5, at 1272.
110. See sources cited supra note 38.
111. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1274; see also O’Brien & Salop, supra note 34, at 568
(explaining the impact of financial interest and corporate control on the competitive incentives of
the acquiring firms).
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The theory is, as mentioned, rapidly gaining proponents. The
federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission, have reportedly launched
investigations into instances of interlocking shareholding,112 and the
European Commission has recently blocked a merger based, inter alia,
on this theory of competitive harm.113
II. CHALLENGING (NOW) CONVENTIONAL WISDOM—CAN
COMPETITION INDEED BE SPONTANEOUSLY CURTAILED?
The argument developed in this Article is that institutional
investors’ cross ownership does nothing to dampen competition. To
be sure, such cross ownership may aid existing cartels by facilitating
explicit coordination. It may also allow information to be shared,
thereby aiding and stabilizing cartels. But there is wide consensus that
institutional investors do not engage in coordination or in information
sharing (between boards).114 And for a host of reasons enumerated by
Hemphill and Kahan and reviewed subsequently, it is also unlikely
that institutional investors will engage in such conduct.115 Therefore,
if cross ownership does not harm competition through its structural
impact on incentives, there is little reason to deal with it and unduly
deny retail investors the benefits of diversification.
First and foremost, the mechanism through which shareholders’
incentives supposedly trickle down to management is unclear. Unless
such a mechanism is identified, there is little reason to fear that
managers will unilaterally adopt any anti-competitive measures that
they would not have adopted but for the cross ownership. It is here that
the observation regarding the self-harming nature of unilateral
coordination comes into play. Recall that in the context of unilateral
coordination, the theory of competitive harm requires managers to
relax competition in a manner that is detrimental to the firm that they
manage. As demonstrated in the example presented earlier, the
unilaterally coordinating firm essentially diverts profits to the
112. See sources cited supra note 56.
113. Case C-M.7932, Dow/DuPont, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf.
114. See sources cited supra note 37.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 214–21. Very briefly Hemphill & Kahan, supra note
18, point to institutional investors’ incentives and sensitivity to illegal conduct; their regular
conduct when engaging with portfolio firms’ managements; and their internal structure and modus
operandi (with different teams having different incentives), as rendering these scenarios unlikely.
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competitor by raising its own prices to an unprofitable level.116 Why
would management conduct itself in a manner that harms the company
under management?
The intuitive answer to this puzzle is reciprocity. In the
oligopolistic setting, the firm may expect its competitor to follow suit
and raise prices as well. This may indeed be the case, and few would
argue that tacit collusion (which is generally legal)117 does not occur
in oligopolistic markets. But this has nothing to do with cross
ownership. This is an outcome of concentration within the product
market in which the firms held by the cross-owning institutional
investors compete. The product market may be conducive to tacit
collusion, and it may not. If it is, for example, because there are only
three competitors, market prices will indeed be higher than the
competitive prices. A firm—any firm, whether or not its shareholders
cross-own competitors—may indeed attempt to raise prices hoping
that its competitor will reciprocate. If the product market is not
conducive to tacit collusion, prices can be expected to be competitive.
But regardless of what the product market equilibrium is, there is no
reason to think that managers will forego profit absent a mechanism
that incentivizes them to do so. The question therefore resonates even
in the oligopolistic setting—why would managers act in a manner that
is detrimental to the firm they manage? Several possible explanations
for this are considered and shown to be unpersuasive.
A. Managerial Compensation Linked to Industry Performance
One answer offered in the literature to this puzzle118 is that
managers’ performance-based compensation may be linked to
performance of the industry rather than to performance of the specific
firm (or the extent to which the specific firm’s performance exceeds

116. Or by engaging in equivalent conduct, for example, by deteriorating the quality of the
product, or the like.
117. See supra note 79; Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 666 (1962); Jonathan B.
Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and
Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 145 (1993); Green et al., supra note
106 (examining the economics literature on tacit collusion in oligopoly markets). But see Posner,
supra note 65, at 1575.
118. E.g., Miguel Antón et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management
Incentives (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Working Paper No. 511,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332.

(8) 54.3_PALDOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

814

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

6/20/21 2:49 PM

[Vol. 54:785

industry performance).119 Specifically, managers may be granted
stock and options of the firms they manage.120 In an influential article
on managerial compensation, Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker argue that
managerial compensation plans are not an outcome of optimal
contracting, but rather of managerial power.121 Within this framework,
Bebchuck et al. analyze the phenomenon of granting management
options to purchase firm stock.122 Bebchuck et al. observe that as a
result of such a mechanism, managers’ compensation is conditioned
on absolute share price, rather than on the performance of the stock in
comparison to other firms’ stock.123 The thrust of Bebchuck et al.’s
argument is that managers may, through such a mechanism, be
rewarded for stock-price increases that they did not contribute to.124
But the observation has important implications in the current setting
too.
In the specific context of competition between portfolio firms,
granting managers stock or options in the firms they manage
effectively rewards them for the elimination of competition.125
Eliminating competition will increase all competing firms’ profits,
including those of the firm under management.126 The value of
management’s stock will also increase.127 Stock and options thus
incentivize managers to chill competition.128 This may seemingly
bring about the anti-competitive conduct envisaged by the recent
literature.
But a closer look at such compensation plans reveals that they are
unlikely to bring about what has been termed here as unilateral
coordination. Stock and options cannot incentivize unilateral
coordination of the kind envisaged in the recent literature. In fact, in
the context of unilateral coordination the competitive effect of stock
119. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 803–04 (2002).
120. Id. at 791–92.
121. Id. at 753.
122. Id. at 791–93.
123. Id. at 802.
124. Id. The point is stressed in LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 122 (2004).
125. See D. Daniel Sokol & Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Antitrust Corporate Governance and
Compliance, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 2–5
(Robert D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 3.
128. See id. at 3–5.
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and options is reversed. Granting managers stock or options in the firm
they manage creates a disincentive to unilaterally coordinate. If the
firm unilaterally coordinates, the effect on the price of its own stock
will be negative. Profits will flow to competitors, whose stock price
will be positively affected. But the stock price of the unilaterally
coordinating firm can be expected to plummet. This is a result of the
simple observation offered earlier and summarized in Table 1. As
explained, unilateral coordination entails two inseparable elements:
An increase in total industry profits and the tunneling of these profits
to a single firm to the detriment of all other industry firms. If
managers’ compensation is linked to the profitability of their own
firm, they will try to prevent profits from flowing to competitors.
Managerial compensation plans granting management stock or
options in the firm under their management cannot result in unilateral
coordination. In order to incentivize unilateral coordination,
compensation must be designed to benefit management when two
conditions are met: (1) competitors do well, and (2) the firm under
management performs relatively poorly at the same time. Stock and
options (of the managed firm) do not accomplish this.
Moreover, even if stock and options could somehow incentivize
unilateral coordination, this would have little to do with cross
ownership. Neither the fact that portfolio firms are cross-owned nor
the fact that they are cross-owned by several investors (be they lay
investors or institutional investors) exacerbates any competitive
concern. A shareholder—any shareholder—benefits from relaxing
competition between the firm it has holdings in and the firm’s
competitors. This is the case even if the shareholder holds none of the
competitors’ stock. A shareholder—again, any shareholder—may
thus devise a compensation plan that incentivizes management to
compete less vigorously by explicitly or tacitly coordinating with
competitors. The shareholder’s holdings in competitors or the lack of
such holdings do not change the profitability of anti-competitive
conduct in any way. Consider a shareholder who holds 2 percent of a
firm’s stock. Suppose that the firm is the only firm in the shareholder’s
portfolio. The shareholder’s profits will clearly increase if the firm
forms a cartel. The shareholder will gain 2 percent of every additional
dollar of profit facilitated by the cartel. If the shareholder splits its
holdings between portfolio firms, and owns 1 percent of the stock of
the original firm and 1 percent of the competitor’s stock, the
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profitability of a cartel between the portfolio firms remains the same.
Cross ownership does nothing to increase the shareholder’s incentive
to relax competition. Similarly, the question of whether the stock—be
it 2 percent of one firm’s stock or 1 percent of each firms’ stock—is
held by a single investor or by several investors does not in any way
change the analysis. And indeed, previous scholarly work has
suggested that compensation plans of this sort may bring about explicit
coordination as a general matter, regardless of cross ownership.129
Cross ownership and unilateral coordination are not required for anticompetitive conduct to be profitable, and they do not increase the
shareholder’s (or shareholders’) gains from such anti-competitive
conduct. They cannot exacerbate the problem.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to recommend a specific rule
to be applied to possible compensation plans that link managers’
compensation to the performance of competing firms.130 For current
purposes, it suffices to acknowledge that such compensation plans are
undoubtedly a mechanism through which shareholder’ (not
necessarily cross owners’) incentives to inhibit competition trickle
down to management. Antitrust law should indeed deal with the
phenomenon, much like it deals with acquisition of competitors’
stock. But importantly for current purposes, this has nothing to do with
cross ownership or with incentivizing unilateral coordination, and
therefore does not explain how cross ownership may inhibit
competition. The recent literature’s reliance on such compensation
plans as a possible mechanism for incentivizing unilateral
coordination131 is misplaced.

129. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 119, at 804. Bebchuck et al. reject the “softening industry
competition” explanation for granting managers stock and options. But their objection does not
challenge the economic analysis. Id. Bebchuck et al. reject this explanation mainly because as an
empirical matter such compensation plans normally link compensation not to specific-industry
performance but rather to broader price increases. Id. This objection does not imply that such
compensation plans cannot incentivize managers to soften competition.
130. Devising such a rule requires a comprehensive analysis of the potential welfare-enhancing
effects of such compensation plans and a balancing of these effects against the clear anticompetitive effects of the plans. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Gershon N. Mandelker, Managerial
Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions, 42 J. FIN. 823 (1987). A per se
illegality rule may be appropriate, and a rule of reason may be appropriate—if enough welfareenhancing effects are identified—specifically when the industry-performance-dependent
component of compensation is trivial. See Bebchuck et al., supra note 119 (offering possible ways
to address the situation in which stock prices are unrelated to managers’ performance).
131. See Antón et al., supra note 118; Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1556–57.
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B. Future External Remuneration
A second mechanism that may incentivize management to
manage the firm in a self-harming manner for the benefit of noncontrolling, passive, cross owners is future external remuneration. The
term “future external remuneration,” as used here, refers to
consideration that it occurs outside the realm of the unilaterally
coordinating firm. The possibility of remuneration within the
unilaterally coordinating firm, such as support of managers in future
votes or salary increases, is discussed separately in Section II.C.
Future external remuneration may take the form of employment
within the institutional investor’s organization, future employment in
other firms in which the institutional investor may have holdings,
lucrative consulting agreements, or any other form of remuneration
that is detached from the unilaterally coordinating firm.
1. The Basic Remuneration Scheme
At first blush, the basic mechanism seems simple enough:
Managers act in a manner that benefits the institutional investor. In
return, the institutional investor rewards the manager with some
beneficial consideration. For example, after the manager has left the
company, the institutional investor may hire her as a consultant for a
hefty fee.
However, a closer look reveals the shortcomings of this analysis.
At the outset, recall once again that absent coordination with
competing firms, serving the institutional investor’s (or institutional
investors’) interests requires foregoing profit. This, in turn, implies
that managers are breaching their fiduciary obligations to all other
shareholders (and other stakeholders, if such a fiduciary duty is
owed).132 They are simply tunneling133 profits from the firm to the
institutional shareholder,134 and consequently bearing the risk of civil
132. See Edward M. Iacobucci, Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Prudential Regulation of
Financial Institutions, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 183, 186–87 (2015).
133. The term “tunneling” is problematic in this context, as tunneling normally describes “the
transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them.” Simon Johnson
et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22–27 (2000). In the current context, the benefited entities
are not controllers. Nonetheless, from the perspective of the effect on the firm, the phenomenon
discussed here is no different—although, as I argue, unlikely precisely because the benefitted entity
is not a controller.
134. In a recent case before the Israeli District Court in Tel Aviv, a publicly traded firm’s
controller committed to pay management a specific discretionary bonus if the bonus was not
granted by the board. The court ruled that officers are not allowed to receive direct remuneration
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lawsuits and, at times, criminal proceedings, with no immediate
gain.135 Moreover, if managers’ compensation is in any way linked to
their own firm’s performance, be it through stock, options, bonuses,
or other compensation methods, they are in fact paying (in the form of
lost compensation) for this tunneling scheme.136 Their immediate
return on this payment is civil and criminal liability. If there is no
explicit quid pro quo agreement between management and the
institutional investors for compensation (which would be illegal),137
the manager’s remuneration is the shareholders’ gratitude and the
prospect of future consideration.138
This observation itself does not, of course, make the scenario
impossible. If the shareholder is a prominent and influential capital
market player, such gratitude may be valuable.139 But if this is the case,
unilateral coordination is both implausible, and—far more
importantly—has nothing to do with cross ownership or with large
financial interests. Both of these points will be elaborated next.
Subsequently, two additional complications that cast doubt on the
probability, and in fact on the very possibility, of such competitive
harm will be discussed. These final two complications have to do with
the possibility of market self-correction and the fact that institutional
investors have divergent holdings in portfolio firms.

from controllers. The rationale for this ruling is precisely the possibility that this will distort
management’s incentives and cause it to act to the benefit of the controller at the expense of other
shareholders. DerivC (DC TA) 18994-05-17 De Lange v. Israel Corp., Nevo Legal Database
(Apr. 30, 2017) (Isr.).
135. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (outlining the standards of
conduct required of directors); see also DerivC (DC TA) 18994-05-17 De Langa v. Israel Corp.,
Nevo Legal Database (Apr. 30, 2017) (Isr.) (serving as an example of the risk of lawsuits managers
run). See generally G. P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 8–12 (1996) (discussing fiduciary duties directors owe to shareholders and the
varying interests of the two).
136. Once again, managerial compensation dependent on the specific firm’s performance may
incentivize explicit coordination or tacit collusion. See Abrantes-Metz & Sokol, supra note 125, at
2. But it will not incentivize unilateral coordination.
137. If the quid pro quo is explicit, the manager is discharging its obligations under a clear
conflict of interest and in breach of its fiduciary duties. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§§ 8.31(a)(2)(i), (iii), (v), 8.42.
138. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1274.
139. On the importance of leading capital market players in general, see John E. Core et al.,
Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN.
ECON. 371, 372–73 (1999); Richard M. Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and TopManagement Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MGMT. SCI. 453, 453–69 (2002).
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2. The Scenario Is Implausible
Let us begin with the likelihood of the scenario. The likelihood of
future remuneration is a function of two determinants. First, the
benefitted shareholder must be expected to deliver on an unspecified,
unspoken,140 non-binding commitment to make some undetermined
future payment. This itself does not negate the possibility of future
remuneration, most importantly because if the institutional investor is
a repeat player (as most institutional investors are), reputation may
substitute for enforceability.141 But this is not enough. Obviously, the
shareholder must also be aware that the manager has acted in a manner
that was designed to benefit the shareholder at the expense of all other
stakeholders. At the same time, all other shareholders (as well as all
other stakeholders) must not realize what is transpiring. The more
obscure or subtle the conduct, the less likely the benefitted shareholder
is to realize that the manager has acted in a manner that warrants
remuneration.142 The more egregious the conduct, the more likely
other stakeholders (and authorities) are to realize what the manager is
doing.143 Thus, although this observation does not render the scenario
impossible, it does cast serious doubt on its likelihood.
140. The commitment must be unspoken. Otherwise, both the shareholder and management
will be exposed to criminal sanctions. See supra note 137.
141. This may be done for a host of reasons. Importantly, the shareholder may find it valuable
to obtain a reputation of a shareholder that rewards managers who have furthered its interests. In
this context, Professor Heymann’s observation, although focusing on reputation in its social
context, is useful: “At its core, then, reputation is the result of the collective act of judging another
and the potential use of that result to direct future engagements.” Laura A. Heymann, The Law of
Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (2011). For a discussion
of reputation in the business context (although focusing on corporate reputation and employee
reputation), see Karen S. Cravens & Elizabeth Goad Oliver, Employees: The Key Link of Corporate
Reputation Management, 49 BUS. HORIZONS 293 (2006). For a formal comprehensive discussion
of reputation in settings in which players have repeated interactions (as in the current setting), see
GEORGE J. MAILATH & LARRY SAMUELSON, REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATIONS: LONG-RUN
RELATIONSHIPS (2006).
142. Management may be able to bring its conduct to the attention of the shareholder. But it is
in the manager’s interest to claim that it has acted to the benefit of the shareholder (and the
detriment of other stakeholders) regardless of whether or not this is true. This makes the manager’s
report to the shareholder less credible.
143. Other shareholders’ financial interest in detecting such breaches may be small. But the
possibility of filing a class action—and receiving the monetary consideration as class plaintiff—
should provide enough incentives to detect the breach and pursue an action. In this context, it is
important to recall that the setting becomes more conducive to unilateral coordination as the
controller’s financial interest in the unilaterally coordinating company decreases, implying that
other shareholders will find it even more appealing to act. Not surprisingly, the case cited by Rock
& Rubinfeld, supra note 1 as the only case alleging such conduct—In re Domestic Airline Travel
Antitrust Litigation, 221 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2016)—is a class action. In any event, authorities
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3. The Scenario Has Nothing to Do with Cross Ownership
Far more important than the likelihood of the scenario, is the fact
that this scenario has very little to do with cross ownership or with
large financial interests. The shareholder in question need not be the
controlling shareholder, or even a large shareholder, of the unilaterally
coordinating firm. The prerequisite for this scenario is only that the
benefitted shareholder be a prominent figure. In fact, on closer
examination, the smaller the financial stakes the shareholder has in the
unilaterally coordinating firm, the more profitable and likely unilateral
coordination becomes. The institutional investor’s holdings in the
unilaterally coordinating firm make unilateral coordination less
profitable, easier to detect, and easier to punish. Cross ownership is an
obstacle to unilateral coordination.
To see why, let the following setting be considered: BlackRock,
a leading institutional investor, holds 0.5 percent of firm A’s
outstanding stock and 3 percent of firm B’s outstanding stock. Firm
A’s CEO decides to raise firm A’s prices to an unprofitable level so
that profits flow to firm B, to BlackRock’s benefit. This scenario is
one of the scenarios envisioned by advocates of the anti-competitive
theory of harm brought about by cross ownership.
First, the ploy is more profitable for BlackRock the smaller its
holdings in firm A. The profitability of the scheme is a function of the
difference in BlackRock’s holdings in the unilaterally coordinating
firm and in the firm to which profits flow. For any level of holding in
the competing firm (firm B), if BlackRock’s holdings drop to zero in
the unilaterally coordinating firm (firm A), its profits are
maximized. 144
Second, if BlackRock is not a shareholder of the unilaterally
coordinating firm, the scheme becomes much more difficult to detect,
if not practically undetectable. If BlackRock is a shareholder of firm
A, other stakeholders of the firm or authorities are likely to be alarmed
by a business decision that turns out to be harmful to the firm, when
another firm held by BlackRock reports increased earnings at the same
and criminal sanctions, which are probably an even greater deterrent than civil action, definitely
become more likely as the conduct becomes more questionable.
144. In the numeric example used here, BlackRocks’ profits are increased by 0.5 cents for every
dollar that flows to firm B as a result of the scheme. Rather than 2.5 cents for every dollar of profit
flowing to firm B (3%–0.5%=2.5%), it will earn 3 cents for every such dollar (3%–0%). The
profitability of the scheme for BlackRock will have increased by 20%.
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time. Even if the precise scheme is unclear, red flags will be raised.
The scheme is far less conspicuous if BlackRock is not a shareholder
of the unilaterally coordinating firm at all.145 This is not to suggest that
detection is always immediate if BlackRock is a shareholder of firm
A. But the unilaterally coordinating manager is better off if BlackRock
is not a shareholder at all.
Finally, in jurisdictions in which shareholders owe fiduciary
duties to each other,146 BlackRock itself, not only management, may
be breaching its fiduciary duties as a shareholder to other shareholders
of the unilaterally coordinating firm if the firm unilaterally
coordinates.
For the preceding reasons, cross ownership is detrimental to the
scheme. If BlackRock holds no shares of the unilaterally coordinating
firm, the scheme is far more profitable, detection is much less likely,
and both management’s risk and BlackRock’s risk (when a fiduciary
duty is owed by shareholders) are significantly mitigated. At the same
time, BlackRock may still realize that the strategy was designed for its
benefit and reward the manager in the future.
Ultimately, the theory boils down to an argument that a firm’s
management may devise a strategy that, while in breach of the
managers’ fiduciary duties, tunnels funds to an influential figure, for
no immediate benefit, but with hope of future reward. An influential
entity’s gratitude may definitely be valuable. And although
prohibited,147 managers may indeed breach their obligations to other
stakeholders if they have the opportunity to self-serve. But even if this
is somehow likely absent an agreement, or at least an explicit

145. If BlackRock is not a shareholder, management’s conduct is far more likely to be
effectively protected under the business judgment rule than if shareholders’ conflicting interests
are observed. On the business judgment rule, see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d
693, 697–98, 746–48 (Del. Ch. 2005); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812–13 (Del. 1984),
overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
146. The fiduciary duties that may be owed in closely held corporations, see, e.g., Hagshenas
v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), are, of course, irrelevant to the current setting. But
in some jurisdictions, fiduciary duties may be owed by controlling shareholders of publicly traded
corporations as well. See Frank Martin Laprade, Eur. Parliament, Directorate-Gen. for Internal
Pol’ys, Rights and Obligations of Shareholders: National Regimes and Proposed
Instruments at EU Level for Improving Legal Efficiency, at 30 (May 2012), https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/dv/pe462463_/pe462463_en.pdf; § 192(a),
Companies Law, 5759–1999 (Isr.), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/
CompaniesLaw57591999.pdf; Joseph Gross, Trends in the Duties of Holders of Control in a
Company, 1 A Mishpat Va’Asakim 271 (2004).
147. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.31(a)(2)(i), (iii), (v), 8.42 (AM. BAR ASS’ N 2019).
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understanding, it has very little to do with cross ownership in the
industry. In fact, cross ownership is detrimental to this kind of
conduct.
4. The Scenario Is Frustrated by Capital Market Players’ Expected
Response
A third important point in this respect is one made by Rock and
Rubinfeld. Even if unilateral coordination were likely, the market
would presumably self-correct.148 Recall, once again, that the scenario
envisaged is one in which the institutional investors who the
unilaterally coordinating firm or firms set out to please do not control
these firms. This in turn suggests that the unilaterally coordinating
firms present a lucrative investment opportunity. As Rock and
Rubinfeld state: “Without control, any sacrifice of firm profits out of
deference to a shareholder’s other holdings will provide a profitable
investment opportunity for a shareholder that thinks it can shift the
strategy back towards maximizing single firm value.”149
Importantly, a potential shareholder that identified this
investment opportunity need not even engage in a takeover battle or
attempt to control the firm. As unilateral coordination is wasteful
(from the unilaterally coordinating firm’s perspective), all other
shareholders would benefit from discontinuing such unilateral
coordination. And as the benefitted shareholder is not a controlling
shareholder, it would be enough for the investor identifying unilateral
coordination (or otherwise suboptimal bad management) to buy any
amount of stock, explain the situation to other shareholders who have
no cross holdings in the industry or whose holdings are larger in the
unilaterally coordinating firm, and make a profit by discontinuing the
practice. If unilateral coordination occurred, this would clearly attract
activist investors, whose task would be easier than usual.150 They
could simply purchase stock and draw other shareholders’ attention to
the fact that profits had been tunneled. The market could be expected
to swiftly self-correct.

148. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 251.
149. Id.
150. For an account of activist investors’ involvement in firms’ conduct, see Michal Barzuza
& Eric L. Talley, Long-Term Bias (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 449, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3338631.
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5. The Opposing Interests of Institutional Investors Safeguard
Against Competitive Harm
A final shortcoming of the anti-competitive theory has to do with
the divergent holdings of institutional investors. Portfolio firms are
cross-owned by several institutional investors with different holdings
in each firm. This is a fatal blow to the possibility of competitive harm.
The reason is that if each institutional investor’s stake in the competing
firms is different, each investor will prefer that a different firm be the
unilaterally coordinating firm. Investors want profits to flow to the
firm in which their own holdings are greatest. Each institutional
investor’s preference will thus depend on its individual difference in
holdings and may therefore be very different from other institutional
investors’ preferences. If investor X, a cross owner of firms A and B,
has larger holdings in firm A than in firm B, and investor Y, a second
cross owner, has larger holdings in firm B than in firm A, portfolio
firms’ managements will be deadlocked even if they have made the
decision to engage in this form of tunneling. To understand how
limiting this is to the theory of competitive harm, it is helpful to note
that in all of the industries surveyed in the recent literature, a conflict
of interests among institutional shareholders would severely challenge
any hope of unilateral coordination.
The pharmaceutical industry, which is presented by Azar et al. as
an illustrative industry conducive to unilateral coordination,
demonstrates this neatly.151 According to Azar et al., in the pharmacy
industry, the five largest institutional investors who hold stock in CVS
are BlackRock, Fidelity, Vanguard, State Street, and Wellington.152
They hold a total of slightly less than 25 percent of CVS’s stock.153
The same institutional investors also hold approximately 19.55
percent of Walgreens’ stock.154 Assuming the product market is
relatively concentrated, the hypothesis is that industry firms’
managements will act to further the interests of these shareholders at
the expense of other shareholders. However, once the joint holdings
of the three largest institutional investors are broken down by investor,
it becomes clear that if management were to attempt to serve these

151.
152.
153.
154.

Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1515 tbl.1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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investors it would, absent explicit coordination, find itself baffled. The
respective holdings are elaborated in the following table:

Table 2155
Investor

Holdings in CVS

Holdings in Walgreen

BlackRock

5.9%

4.44%

Fidelity

5.1%

3.07%

Vanguard

4.78%

5.26%

BlackRock and Fidelity hold approximately 6 percent and 5
percent of CVS’s stock, respectively, and approximately 4.5 percent
and 3 percent of Walgreens’ stock, respectively. They both have a
strong preference for profits to flow from Walgreens to CVS. But
Vanguard holds 4.78 percent of CVS’s shares and 5.26 percent of
Walgreens’ shares. Vanguard thus prefers that profits flow to
Walgreens. If CVS were to unilaterally coordinate (i.e., unprofitably
raise its own prices to the benefit of Walgreens), BlackRock and
Fidelity would have lost. If Walgreens were to do the same, Vanguard
would have lost.
Under these circumstances, unilateral coordination is even less
likely. It is difficult to decide which influential institutional investor
to serve and which to harm. Furthermore, even if management
somehow makes this decision, a problem of detection emerges. Unlike
serving an influential shareholder when all other shareholders are
dispersed, lay retail investors, who have neither the incentives nor the
ability to monitor performance,156 in the current setting there will
always be a professional (institutional) shareholder with significant
holdings that has been harmed. This shareholder is as likely to realize
that it has been harmed as the benefitted shareholder is to realize that
it has been benefitted. And since the harmed shareholder has
significant holdings in the unilaterally coordinating firm, it is much
more likely to take action.

155. Id. (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the article).
156. Although, as suggested earlier, there are mechanisms—most notably the class action
mechanism, that can be expected to offset shareholder indifference—specifically in the current
setting. See supra note 143.
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Again, institutional investors may coordinate between themselves
and agree that profits should flow to CVS, where their joint holdings
(25 percent) are greater than their joint holdings in Walgreens (19.55
percent).157 BlackRock and Fidelity, who will have gained from this,
will have gained more than Vanguard will have lost. As the net effect
of this unilateral coordination is positive (from the cross owners’ joint
perspective), the losing party can be compensated. But this requires
both explicit coordination at the investors’ level, which would be a
criminal offense, and some method through which the joint decision
is conveyed to management (which would, in turn, be violating its own
duties). As Hemphill and Kahan explain, intervening with firm
conduct at such a level would be extremely conspicuous.158 In any
event, the structural incentives created by horizontal shareholdings
cannot spontaneously result in unilateral coordination.
A similar problem emerges when considering the second industry
with concentrated ownership that is provided by the recent literature
as an example of the effects of cross ownership—the banking industry.
Here too, according to Azar et al., the six largest investors hold
approximately 24 percent of JP Morgan Chase, 20 percent of Bank of
America, and over 33 percent of Citigroup. But when these holdings
are broken down, the picture becomes much more complicated:

Table 3159
Investor

Holdings in Holdings in Bank Holdings in
JP Morgan of America
Citigroup
Chase

BlackRock

6.7%

5.38%

9.29%

Fidelity

3.16%

2.56%

3.83%

Vanguard

4.78%

4.51%

4.4%

157. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1515 tbl.1 (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the
article).
158. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1444–45.
159. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1515 tbl.1 (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the
article).
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Any unilateral coordination that benefits BlackRock and Fidelity
will be harmful to Vanguard, and vice versa. This industry is even
more problematic than the pharmaceutical industry because the
industry is comprised of three banks. Therefore, two banks would need
to unilaterally coordinate for each investor to benefit from such
conduct. Both JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America would need to
unprofitably raise their prices so that Citigroup could enjoy supracompetitive returns. This requires even more elaborate coordination
and is therefore even less likely to occur absent explicit coordination
amongst investors and explicit instructions to management.
The argument is slightly less immediate in the third industry
presented by Azar et al., the technology industry. The largest
shareholders jointly hold approximately 20 percent of Apple, and 27
percent of Microsoft.160 All three joint institutional investors—
BlackRock, Fidelity and Vanguard—have greater stakes in Microsoft,
as summarized in the following table:

Table 4161
Investor

Holdings in Apple

Holdings in Microsoft

BlackRock

5.58%

5.33%

Fidelity

3.28%

3.08%

Vanguard

4.95%

4.49%

Although their holdings in Apple are only slightly greater than
their holdings in Microsoft, BlackRock, Vanguard, and Fidelity
undoubtedly all prefer profits to flow to Apple. But Microsoft’s thirdlargest shareholder is, according to Azar et al., Bill Gates, who holds
4.52 percent of Microsoft’s stock. Bill Gates holds none of Apple’s
stock, and therefore clearly has an extremely strong preference for
profits to flow to Microsoft.162 It is unlikely, and then some, that
Microsoft will unilaterally coordinate. Any dollar unilaterally lost to
Apple implies an almost five cent loss to Microsoft’s third largest
shareholder (Bill Gates). The benefit to Microsoft’s three other large
160. Id. (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the article).
161. Id. (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the article).
162. Id.
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shareholders is approximately one cent in total.163 It is similarly
unlikely that Apple will act to the detriment of its largest shareholders
to the benefit of Bill Gates, who has no holdings in Apple.164 Once
again, shareholders may coordinate price, quantities, or other
competitive dimensions, and then notify managements of their
decisions. Alternatively, they may agree that it is worthwhile to have
one firm unilaterally raise its prices to the benefit of the other firm.
But they would then need to agree on payments to be made by the
shareholder or shareholders benefitting from this unilateral
coordination to the shareholders or shareholder losing from it (and,
once again, at minimum, inform management of the unilaterally
coordinating firm of their decision). These compensation schemes are,
given the differences in holdings, extremely complex, and can be
expected to require elaborate formulae and lengthy negotiations.
Absent explicit (illegal) coordination, this is extremely unlikely.
A similar coordination problem emerges in all of the industries
surveyed by Posner et al. as oligopolistic industries in which there are
significant cross ownership patterns. In the mobile phone industry
there are four major competitors—AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and
Sprint.165 When looking at institutional investors’ holdings in each of
these competitors, it is clear that they have completely opposing (and
very strong) preferences. Vanguard, BlackRock, and Capital Group’s
stakes in Verizon are larger than their stakes in any other company in
the industry.166 They would clearly insist that profits flow to Verizon.
Evercore is invested only in AT&T and would thus lose if profits were
to flow to any other competitor.167 Deutsche Telekom holds slightly
more than 65 percent of T-Mobile (with no holdings in any other
competitor), and SoftBank holds nearly 83 percent of Sprint’s stock,

163. I limit the analysis to the three largest shareholders for consistency, as these are the same
investors previously considered. If one looks at these shareholders alone, total gains from unilateral
coordination are less than one cent (0.25+0.46+0.2=0.91). However, such conduct by Microsoft
will yield a total benefit of slightly more than one cent to its large shareholders, because the fourth
largest shareholder, State Street, holds 4.59 percent of Apple and 4.39 percent of Microsoft, so an
additional 0.2 cents will accrue to a large shareholder. This, however, does not change the analysis.
Bill Gates will have lost approximately five cents, for a benefit of 1.11 cents divided among four
other shareholders.
164. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1515 tbl.1.
165. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 726.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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with no holding in any other competitor.168 Absent explicit
coordination between Deutsche Telekom, Vanguard, BlackRock,
SoftBank, and Evercore, it is extremely difficult to unilaterally
coordinate. The breakfast cereal, aluminum, and cooking-stoves
industries all demonstrate similar holding patterns.169 In each of these
industries different influential shareholders can be expected to have
contradicting (and strong) preferences with respect to where profits
should flow to.
Finally, the airline industry, the second industry analyzed by Azar
et al., also exhibits a holding pattern that makes unilateral coordination
unlikely.170 Rock and Rubinfeld reformat the data on institutional
investors’ holdings in the airline industry as a spreadsheet.171 A quick
glance at this spreadsheet shows that the largest shareholder in each of
the six major airlines is almost always different from the largest
shareholder in the other airlines: Delta Air Lines’ largest shareholder
is Berkshire Hathaway; Southwest Airlines Co.’s largest shareholder
is PRIMECAP; American Airlines’ largest shareholder is T. Rowe
Price; United Continental Holdings’ largest shareholders are
BlackRock and Berkshire Hathaway (each with 9.2 percent of
Continental’s stock); Alaska Air’s largest shareholder is T. Rowe
Price; and JetBlue Airways’ largest shareholder is Vanguard.172
Absent explicit coordination, it is impossible to see how unilateral
coordination may have occurred.
In the airline industry, the idea of unilateral coordination is even
more perplexing. In addition to the very different holdings, Rock and
Rubinfeld also show that holdings in the airline industry changed
dramatically over time.173 A quick glance at this spreadsheet shows
that the largest shareholder in each of the six major airlines is almost
always different from the largest shareholder in the other airlines:
Delta Air Lines’ largest shareholder is Berkshire Hathaway;
Southwest Airlines Co.’s largest shareholder is PRIMECAP;
American Airlines’ largest shareholder is T. Rowe Price; United
Continental Holdings’ largest shareholders are BlackRock and

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. at 727–28.
Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1516 tbl.1.
Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 234 tbl.1A.
Id. (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the article).
Id. at 235 tbl.2.
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Berkshire Hathaway (each with 9.2 percent of Continental’s stock);
Alaska Air’s largest shareholder is T. Rowe Price; and JetBlue
Airways’ largest shareholder is Vanguard. Absent explicit
coordination, it is impossible to see how unilateral coordination may
have occurred.
In the airline industry, the idea of unilateral coordination is even
more perplexing. In addition to the very different holdings, Rock and
Rubinfeld also show that holdings in the airline industry changed
dramatically over time.174 Changes in holdings would further
complicate unilateral coordination, as the unilaterally coordinating
firm would need to constantly change, depending on the firm in which
institutional shareholders’ (joint) holdings were largest at any given
point in time.175 Although data for other industries are not presented,
the general point is extremely relevant to all industries. Institutional
investors constantly change the balance of their portfolios, thereby
altering the relative impact of each portfolio firm on overall
profitability. Any change in the portfolio impacts the profitability of
the scheme and will require renegotiation of payments made by one
institutional investor to the others. When any institutional investor’s
holdings in a specific portfolio firm become larger than its holdings in
another portfolio firm, the whole scheme may need to be renegotiated,
and the unilaterally coordinating firm may need to be changed.
Perhaps counter intuitively, cross ownership of portfolio firms by
several institutional investors actually safeguards against spontaneous
competitive harm.
C. Future Internal Remuneration
“Future internal remuneration” refers to any remuneration the
unilaterally coordinating manager expects to receive within the
unilaterally coordinating firm. For example, the manager may expect
to receive the institutional investors’ support for future salary
increases, generous bonuses, or approval of other suggestions made
by the manager. Without loss of generality, we may think of this kind
of remuneration as taking the form of support in future votes. The
analysis developed in the previous section must be slightly altered to
fit this kind of remuneration. But the basic result remains the same.

174. Id. at 235 tbl.2.
175. Id. at 236.
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In the previous setting of external remuneration it was shown that
holdings in the unilaterally coordinating firm (by the benefitted
institutional investor) is redundant, and in fact harmful to the scheme.
The holding was superfluous, because management could tunnel
profits to the firm in which the institutional investor has a financial
interest even if the institutional investor has no holdings in the
unilaterally coordinating firm. And the grateful institutional investor
could then reward management in the future with a generous
consulting agreement or the like. There was no need for the
institutional investor to hold stock of the unilaterally coordinating firm
at all. As explained, holding in the unilaterally coordinating company
was in fact harmful because it made the scheme less profitable, more
likely to be detected, and potentially exposed the institutional investor
to sanctions for breach of its own duties (when such are owed).
By contrast, if the reward to managers is to take the form of
support in future votes, holdings in the unilaterally coordinating firm
are essential, at least at the stage when management receives its
“payment.” If the institutional investor has no holdings in the
unilaterally coordinating firm, it cannot support management in votes.
However, the previous observations still hold: The scheme is still
less profitable due to the institutional investor’s holding in the
unilaterally coordinating firm; the risk of detection is greater; and the
institutional investor itself may be liable for breach of its own duties
(in jurisdictions where shareholders owe fiduciary duties to other
shareholders). It would therefore generally be preferable for the
institutional investor to purchase equity of the unilaterally
coordinating firm after unilateral coordination had occurred rather
than before management unilaterally coordinates. The institutional
shareholder would then purchase equity after the stock had
depreciated in value due to the tunneling of profits to the competing
firm, rather than hold the unilaterally coordinating firm’s stock as it
depreciated in value. This would also make detection far less likely.
Cross ownership at the time of unilateral coordination is still
unnecessary and harmful (due to the increased risk of detection). The
stock can be purchased at a later stage.
But even if, for whatever reason, the benefitted institutional
investor had to hold equity of the unilaterally coordinating firm before
management unilaterally coordinated, the other objections to the
hypothesis would remain relevant: Other institutional investors whose
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holdings in the unilaterally coordinating firm were greater than their
holdings in the firm to which profits flowed would likely retaliate
against managers that harmed them. Even if these investors did not file
a lawsuit or file complaints with the authorities, they could be
expected to vote against management in future votes. And since the
setting envisaged is one in which the benefitted shareholder is a
shareholder with relatively small holdings in the unilaterally
coordinating firm, the net effect on future voting will regularly be
negative from management’s perspective. The benefitted shareholder
is, by definition, the shareholder whose holdings are small (relative to
its other holdings), whereas all shareholders whose holdings are
greater in the unilaterally coordinating firm will have been alienated.
As the data in tables 2, 3, and 4 suggest, such a strategy would not
have been a profitable strategy (from management’s perspective) in
any of the industries for which data are offered in the recent literature.
The would-be alienated shareholders’ holdings far exceed those of the
would-be grateful shareholders.
Additionally, Rock and Rubinfeld’s observation regarding the
possibility of self-correction by the market makes any such plan even
less likely to succeed.176 Even if the harmed institutional investors do
not retaliate against management at their own initiative, any investor
that noticed that the unilaterally coordinating firm was
underperforming would find it to be a lucrative investment, and could
easily purchase stock with a view to replacing management or altering
its conduct (recall, again, that the benefitted shareholder is not a
controlling shareholder). Once again, as mentioned, this investor
could then quite easily persuade those investors that management had
wronged to join it in outvoting management. Importantly, the investor
need not even purchase a significant share of the unilaterally
coordinating firm’s equity (although this might be a profitable
strategy, as the stock would be underpriced). In all of the industries
surveyed, unilateral coordination harms investors that hold a larger
share of the firm’s equity than the potentially benefitted shareholder.
Thus, there would be no need for a hostile takeover, major purchases
by activist investors, or the like. Simply acquiring some equity and
drawing shareholders’ attention to what had transpired would be
enough. And, of course, this will have been profitable for the activist
176. See id. at 251.
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investor, who will have bought the equity at the lower price and could
sell it once the unilateral coordination was discontinued.
Therefore, although support in future votes, or future internal
remuneration, is slightly different from other forms of consideration,
on closer examination this does not alter the analysis significantly.
Such forms of remuneration indeed require the investor to which
profits are tunneled to hold equity of the unilaterally coordinating firm
at some point. But this form of consideration too does not require
holdings at the time of the unilateral coordination. And in this setting
too, it seems more profitable and less risky for the benefitted
shareholder to purchase stock post-coordination. In this setting too,
there is no reason to think that cross ownership causes, facilitates, or
even streamlines unilateral coordination.
III. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As mentioned, the influential research by Azar et al., which is the
cornerstone of the recent theories of competitive harm, found
empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that institutional
investors’ cross ownership dampens competition. Analyzing the
airline industry, Azar et al. identify a positive effect of common
ownership on ticket prices.177 They use a measurement of
concentration that incorporates ownership-concentration into the
concentration-measurement of an industry—the MHHI.178 Azar et al.
use a measurement of the effect of common ownership (“MHHI∆”),
developed by O’Brien and Salop.179 They exploit BlackRock’s
acquisition of Barclays Global Investors to confirm the results and find
that “ticket prices are approximately 3% to 7% higher in the average
U.S. airline route than would be the case under separate ownership.”180
This would seem to support the recent theory of competitive
harm. However, Azar et al.’s methodology has been challenged by
several subsequent writers.181

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
5; Rock
98.

Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1517, 1523–49.
Id. at 1532 tbl.4. The MHHI is a modified HHI. On the basic HHI, see supra note 25.
Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1519.
Id. at 1517.
See O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 44, at 25–26; Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at
& Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 223, 229–51; Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1397–
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First, the use of MHHI∆, as well as any HHI-type measurement
(which Gramlich and Grundl denote as GHHI—General HHI),182
suffers from potential endogeneity problems. This is the case because
quantities cleared by the market, which the HHI uses to measure
concentration, are a function, inter alia, of market concentration183 and
because ownership shares are not strictly an independent variable.
Ownership shares (MHHI—the independent variable used by Azar et
al.) are dependent, inter alia, on factors other than common ownership,
which affect both price and MHHI.184 Therefore, the relationship
between price and MHHI may be a function of these factors. Gramlich
and Grundl themselves, when controlling for the endogeneity
problem, find mixed results.185
Second, Rock and Rubinfeld argue that the change in
concentration in holdings that resulted from BlackRock’s merger with
BGI (from around 3 percent each to 6 percent) is, from a theoretical
perspective, an implausible explanation for the price increase.186 They
also discuss additional possible events that may have triggered the
price increase, arguing that these are not controlled for in the Azar et
al. research.187
Third, Rock and Rubinfeld argue that the timing of the “natural
shock”—BlackRock’s merger with BGI—coincides with at least two
or three other potentially powerful explanations for the price
increase.188 The merger occurred in 2009, a year after Delta’s
acquisition of Northwest airlines, and when the adverse effects of the
2008 recession were diminishing.189 Also, in 2010, one year following
the merger, United acquired Continental.190 Rock and Rubinfeld
suggest that these mergers may have increased product quality, which
in turn might imply that quality-adjusted prices stayed constant or
even decreased.191 Alternatively, even if quality-adjusted prices
182. Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at 2.
183. Id. at 2–3.
184. Id.
185. Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at 3, 19–29. Rock & Rubinfeld note that Azar et al.
comment on the endogeneity, but do not offer instrumental variables to control for this. See Rock
& Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 242.
186. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 242–43.
187. Id. at 243.
188. Id. at 243–44.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 244.
191. Id.
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indeed increased, this could have been a result of increased productmarket concentration (attributable to mergers within the product
market), rather than of increased concentration at the shareholder
level.192 Ultimately, Rock and Rubinfeld “find unconvincing Azar et
al.’s evidence suggesting that increased ticket prices were due to the
BlackRock/BGI merger rather than these alternative, highly plausible,
explanations.”193
Finally, Hemphill and Kahan point to a mismatch between the
empirical evidence and the underlying theories of competitive harm.
They offer a typology that distinguishes between potential
mechanisms along three different dimensions and show that at least
some of the potential mechanisms are not supported by the empirical
findings.194 They too find “the case for broad reform unproven”195 and
that there is “a persistent gap in our empirical understanding of
common ownership, namely direct evidence about the ‘who, where,
when, and how’ that [concentrated common owners] employ.”196
In addition to the empirical gap that has already been identified,
the insights offered in this Article suggest that the empirical findings
supporting the theory of competitive harm are problematic from
another important perspective. As explained, compensation
mechanisms linking managerial compensation to industry
performance by granting managers stock and options cannot
incentivize unilateral coordination. They can, however, incentivize
outright cartelistic conduct.197 Consequently, if the validity of the
recent theory of competitive harm is to be tested empirically,
industries in which managerial compensation typically includes a
significant portion of stock and options must be distinguished from
industries in which such compensation is insignificant. Only supracompetitive pricing observed in the latter case may lend support to the
theory. Supra-competitive pricing in industries in which managerial
compensation is linked to the firm’s performance may only lend
support to traditional theories of competitive harm. However, Azar et
al. did not collect data on performance-based compensation of

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1399.
Id. at 1450.
Id. at 1440.
See sources cited in supra notes 128–31.
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management in the industry.198 In line with current theory, the authors
considered industry-linked performance-based compensation to be
one of several mechanisms through which shareholders may
incentivize management to compete less vigorously by unilaterally
coordinating.199 Even if such mechanisms are identified, their
prevalence in the industry is a key determinant of their potential to
induce unilateral coordination.200 This significantly widens the gap
between the empirical evidence collected by Azar et al. and the
underlying theory, a gap that Hemphill and Kahn have already pointed
to.201
As mentioned, Kennedy et al. attempt to address the issues
identified with Azar et al.’s research. They apply a different approach
to the same industry, substituting indices of common ownership
incentives for concentration measures.202 Attempting to construct the
same dataset, they find no evidence that common ownership raises
prices.203
The tentative conclusion to be drawn from the current state of the
empirical research is that the most recent empirical findings support
the theory developed in this Article (and are supported by it), casting
serious doubt on the recent theory of competitive harm. This
conclusion is, as suggested, tentative, and should be taken with a grain

198. See Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1556–60.
199. Id. at 1556, 1558–60.
200. The predictions suggested by this Article are in fact very nuanced regarding how common
such mechanisms must be in an industry to induce unilateral coordination. Even if a mechanism
that links managerial compensation to industry-wide performance—and detaches compensation
from firm-specific performance—is introduced, the prevalence of this mode of compensation in the
industry must also be considered. Perhaps counter-intuitively, industry-wide linkage of
performance-based compensation to industry performance will not incentivize unilateral
coordination. The reason is that all of the firms in which such a compensation mechanism is in
place are incentivized to unilaterally coordinate. Therefore, if all firms in the industry have such
compensation plans in place, each will try to raise its price above that of the competing firms, and
industry prices will be too high, resulting in lost profit. Industry-wide prevalence of industryperformance-dependent compensation will result in a race to the top (from a price perspective), or
to the bottom (from an overall profit perspective). Industry-wide prevalence of such compensation
plans will, however, incentivize cartelistic behavior. Managers will have an interest in reaching an
anti-competitive agreement with their competitors (to the benefit of shareholders), as their profits
are maximized if total industry profits are maximized. It is only when some firms in the industry
have such compensation plans in place that unilateral coordination is plausible. Any empirical
research attempting to ascertain the validity of the theory must be sensitive to this observation. See
Abrantes-Metz & Sokol, supra note 125.
201. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1410.
202. Kennedy et al., supra note 1, at 4.
203. Id.
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of salt. The empirical findings are controversial, and this controversy
has attracted quite some attention,204 resulting in “diametrically
opposed results.”205 Ultimately, while the most recent empirical
studies indeed support the argument pressed in this Article, it seems
that the most compelling conclusion regarding the empirical results is
Rock and Rubinfeld’s conclusion that “[t]here is more work to be
done,”206 echoed by Hemphill and Kahan’s call for more calibrated
empirical research.207
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Following the now widely accepted analysis according to which
cross ownership of firms in oligopolistic product markets
spontaneously results in supra-competitive pricing, antitrust doctrine
has been called on to combat such cross ownership. The argument is
that such cross ownership should be considered to run afoul of section
7 of the Clayton Act.208 To that end, interpretations and analyses of
the “investment-only” exemption afforded by the HSR have been
advanced, arguing that when the relevant transaction-size and firmsize thresholds are met, acquisitions of oligopolistic firms’ stock by
cross owning institutional investors should be subject to ex ante
antitrust scrutiny.209
The analysis developed in this Article shows that this recent
theory misses the mark. Cross ownership by institutional investors
does not, in and of itself, harm competition in any way. However, the
policy implications of the analysis offered in this Article require an
additional step. The conclusion that antitrust law should not deal with
the phenomenon at all does not automatically follow. The reason is
that even if such cross ownership cannot incentivize unilateral
coordination, it may nonetheless incentivize different anti-competitive
conduct. If that is the case, there may be reason to condemn it.
204. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 242 (addressing a potential solution that Azar et
al. offer to the endogeneity problem and explaining why they do not find the solution compelling);
Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at 2 n.1 (discussing additional empirical studies with
contradicting results); Heung Jin Kwon, Executive Compensation Under Common Ownership 1
(Nov. 29, 2016), http://fmaconferences.org/Boston/ExecutiveCompensationunderCommonOwner
ship.pdf (unpublished paper); Antón et al., supra note 118, at 50.
205. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 247.
206. Id. at 245.
207. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1441.
208. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 222.
209. Id. at 274–77.
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Specifically, although shareholders’ preference for lax product-market
competition cannot trickle down to management through the holding
structure, cross ownership may still theoretically incentivize explicit
coordination. Merger control is, as mentioned, designed to preempt
potential harm to competition.210 Therefore, stock acquisitions that
incentivize managements to inhibit competition may justifiably be
blocked.
The problem, however, is that application of antitrust law to
passive cross ownership has a significant social cost on the one hand
and is redundant in addressing the actual competitive concerns on the
other. Additionally, coordination is neither alleged, nor likely, as
demonstrated by Hemphill and Kahan.211 Disallowing mergers based
on the new theories of competitive harm is thus an attempt to address
a very rare (and possibly merely theoretical) phenomenon with a blunt
tool, the costs of which far exceed its benefits.
First, it is extremely unlikely that institutional investors act as
cartel ringmasters. Hemphill and Kahan review the modus operandi of
institutional investors, and explain that the generation of, transmission
of, and inducement to follow a cartelistic strategy is complex.212 There
are several reasons for this. To begin with, the institutional investors
that are identified in the literature on anti-competitive effects of
common ownership are, with few exceptions, comprised of different
business entities.213 Each of these institutional investors is treated in
the literature as a single entity, because their holdings are reported to
the SEC on a consolidated basis214 and through the same legal
entity.215 However, from a business perspective, these are multilayered structures with divergent interests.216 Their investment,
recommendation, and voting operations are conducted by fund
portfolio managers, analysts, and centralized voting units.217 Fund
portfolio managers make investment decisions for the funds they
manage, and each fund portfolio manager is incentivized to increase

210. See supra note 86.
211. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1409.
212. Id. at 1421.
213. Id.
214. Institutional investment managers managing at least $100 million must use Form 13F for
reports to the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2012).
215. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1421.
216. Id. at 1421–23.
217. Id. at 1422.
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the value of the fund under her management.218 Fund portfolio
managers care very little about the performance of other funds under
different (business) management within the same institutional
investor.219 As each fund’s portfolio is likely to be different from other
funds’ portfolios, fund portfolio managers have conflicting interests
with respect to competition between portfolio firms.220 A second
reason for why it would be difficult for an institutional investor to
orchestrate a cartel is that transmission of the strategy, even assuming
one was devised, and inducing performance are also complicated and
dangerous.221 Regardless of who within the institutional investor’s
organization interacted with portfolio firms’ managers, a formidable
problem in its own right,222 Hemphill and Kahan argue that
discussions of specific prices and quantity are likely to draw
attention.223 Institutional investors regularly focus on corporate
governance and compensation structure.224 A discussion of specific
quotas or prices (with more than one product-market firm) would
“almost certainly raise eyebrows.”225 And institutional investors are
extremely sensitive to the reputational costs associated with
scandals. 226 The huge impact of even very slight changes in assets
under management is destructive, even if it is not accompanied by
criminal charges.227 Institutional investors (specifically mutual fund
companies):
[H]ave largely succeeded in staying on everybody’s good
side. The largest players, in particular, enjoy a squeaky-clean
image. Any suggestion that an investment advisor as a
whole . . . had a policy of encouraging firms to pursue an
anticompetitive strategy would be damaging. . . . And a
criminal investigation, let alone an indictment, could be
devastating.228

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 1422–23.
See id. at 1424.
Id. at 1423–26.
Id. at 1425.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1435.
Id.
Id.
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Thus, although theoretically possible, the cartel-ringmaster
scenario is an extremely unlikely one. Moreover, even regardless of
the implausibility of the scenario, blocking mergers based on the new
theories of competitive harm seems unjustified from a regulatory costbenefit analysis.
On the cost side, the logic behind applying merger control for fear
of explicit coordination or information-sharing applies not only to
cases of significant cross ownership. It applies to any case of a
shareholder owning stock in two competing firms. The implications of
a rule designed to prevent such competitive harm would be that all
instances of cross holding should be regulated, regardless of the share
of the outstanding stock that is held in each of the firms. Any
transaction meeting the transaction-size and firm-size thresholds
would need to be blocked. As explained, in contrast to unilateral
coordination, regular coordination—tacit or explicit—benefits both
coordinating firms. If a shareholder is in a position to stabilize a cartel
(and bear the associated risks), other shareholders’ interests will also
have been served through this coordination. The incentives to
eliminate competition are ever-present, and cross ownership does not
alter them in any way. Thus, coordination through a joint shareholder
is simply a matter of opportunity and willingness, not of a difference
in incentives. The question of whether cross ownership is significant
should not matter. If explicit coordination is truly a concern (and there
is little reason to think that it is), the “investment-only” exception to
premerger scrutiny would be effectively abolished. In the specific
context of institutional investors, a prohibition on cross ownership has
unimaginable costs. A rule regulating institutional investors’ ability to
diversify their portfolio will impact the degree of diversification,
which is an important social tool. Such a rule will increase institutional
investors’ (and through them, retail investors’) exposure to firmspecific idiosyncratic risk. Posner et al.’s proposal to limit institutional
investors’ holdings in oligopolistic industries is a notable example of
this risk. Posner et al. have suggested limiting institutional investors
by either allowing them to own stock of only one firm in an
oligopolistic industry, or by limiting the holdings in each of the firms
to a total of 1 percent of the value of the industry.229 The first of these
clearly results in reduced diversification. The second limits the total
229. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 724.
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amount any institutional investor may invest in a specific
(oligopolistic) industry, which imposes a social cost borne by both
sides of the investment transaction: Institutional investors are forced
to invest significantly larger portions of their portfolio in less
appealing opportunities, and oligopolistic-product-market firms are
denied access to capital which would otherwise have been
forthcoming. Posner et al. acknowledge that their proposal has a
negative impact on diversification.230 They argue that the size of the
effect on diversification would be limited.231 But even if the effect on
diversification is limited, it nonetheless exists. The diversification and
discretion of the investors through whom the vast majority of investors
are exposed to capital markets is curtailed. And this will affect trillions
of dollars of investments.
On the benefit side of applying merger control to this setting, very
little can be gained from such application. As cross ownership itself
does not affect the incentives of management, no spontaneous anticompetitive conduct can be expected to ensue. Competition may be
inhibited only through explicit coordination at the managerial level.
Such coordination already violates both antitrust laws and corporate
laws. As explained, each institutional investor has opposing
preferences with respect to the unilaterally coordinating firm.
Therefore, institutional investors would need to coordinate amongst
themselves in order to agree on which firm would unilaterally
coordinate. This kind of agreement would itself be an antitrust offense.
Even assuming such an agreement were reached, institutional
investors would then need to communicate their instructions to
management, which could not know how to act until instructed.
Instruction to management to prefer a course of action that benefits the
cross owning shareholder (or shareholders) at the expense of the firm
(and all other shareholders) is disallowed by corporate law. Managers
who complied with the instructions would be intentionally inflicting

230. Id. at 720.
231. Id. at 710 (citing John Y. Campbell et al., Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile?
An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1 (2001)). They also suggest additional
reasons for why the impact on diversification would be limited. These include the narrower
definition of industry as compared to that proposed by Campbell et al. (who broke major stocks
into forty-nine industries), the importance of industry diversification, a lack of effect on holdings
in industries that are not concentrated, and a “safeguard” policy that would allow holdings even
within the same oligopolistic industry.

(8) 54.3_PALDOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

IN DEFENSE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS

6/20/21 2:49 PM

841

harm on the corporation,232 thereby breaching their own fiduciary
duties.233
It is important to note that, in this context, corporate law would
prohibit compliance with such instructions independently of antitrust
laws. In other circumstances, anti-competitive conduct benefits all
coordinating firms, and as a derivative, all of their shareholders.
Therefore, absent an antitrust prohibition, corporate law should not
only allow, but in fact encourage anti-competitive conduct and
coordination. If not for antitrust law’s prohibition, corporate law
would applaud even the formation of cartels. It is only antitrust law’s
condemnation of cartels and other anti-competitive business practices
that makes them problematic from a corporate-law perspective.
By contrast, in the current setting the vast majority of the
unilaterally coordinating firms’ stakeholders lose from the anticompetitive conduct. As mentioned, unilateral shareholding is simply
a form of tunneling. With the exception of the cross owning
shareholder (or shareholders), whose holdings in the unilaterally
coordinating firm must be relatively small (otherwise unilateral
coordination will have been unprofitable), all shareholders of the
unilaterally coordinating firm lose from this unilateral coordination.
Corporate law prohibits such conduct, which is an egregious breach of
management’s fiduciary duties, regardless of any antitrust-law
prohibition.
Therefore, two independent legislative systems, antitrust law and
corporate law, already prohibit the only type of conduct that cross
ownership may incentivize. And each of these pieces of legislation
prohibits the conduct independently of the other’s prohibition. There
is little value in additional pieces of legislation that may be applied to
the situation.
If there were no downside to applying merger control to the
situation, its application would be neither beneficial nor harmful. But
given the social cost of forcing institutional investors to less lucrative
investments or to undiversified (or much less diversified) portfolios,
and given the unlikelihood of the cartel ringmaster scenario, the social
cost is significant. And the benefit of an additional piece of legislation
that may be cited to address conduct that is already prohibited seems

232. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.09 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
233. Id. § 8.30.
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extremely small. It is far better to steer clear from unnecessarily
regulating institutional investors’ strategy, diversification, and
discretion.
The conclusion to be drawn from the analysis presented in this
Article is, therefore, that antitrust law should not be harnessed to
prohibit passive cross ownership by non-controlling institutional
investors.

